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ABSTRACT 
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M.A. Thesis, August 2016
Advisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ateş Altınordu 
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The urban renewal project being undertaken in Tarlabaşı, Istanbul proclaims itself to be 
honoring the history of the neighborhood’s late Ottoman “multicultural” population 
through historical renovation and renewal. The project, a public-private partnership tied 
closely to the governing Justice and Development Party, presents an understanding of 
history at odds with the previously dominant nationalist narrative, by emphasizing a past 
diversity lost to poor political decisions. In this thesis I take a close look at this narrative of 
lost cosmopolitanism, exploring the pasts it summons, the future it envisions, and the ways 
in which it is used as a tool of exclusion in the present. I engage with theory on nostalgia 
and the malleability of the past, as well as literature on gentrification and the use of 
diversity as a market tool which simultaneously celebrates and destroys that diversity. I 
analyze the discourse around the project through newspaper articles, marketing materials, 
and the public statements of politicians and developers. I find that the project envisions a 
“return” to an imagined version of the late-Ottoman neighborhood of global capitalist 
consumption and European diversity. This is to be accomplished through the clearing away 
of the current undesirable population, and through destroying and selectively rebuilding 
the facades of the local building stock, which is perceived to be incorrectly inhabited and 
thus shows physical signs of “misuse” that are to be removed.  
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İstanbul, Tarlabaşı’nda yapılan kentsel dönüşüm projesi, tarihi restorasyon ve yenileme 
çalışmaları vasıtasıyla mahallenin Geç Osmanlı döneminin ‘çok kültürlü’ nüfusunun 
tarihini onurlandırdığını beyan ediyor. İktidarda olan Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’ne yakın 
bağı bulunan bir özel sector-kamu ortaklığındaki proje, başarısız siyasal kararlar sonucu 
kaybedilmiş çeşitliliğe vurguda bulunarak önceden baskın olan milliyetçi söylemden farklı 
bir tarihsel anlayış sergilemektedir. Bu tez, bu yitirilmiş kozmopolitanizm anlatısını 
yakından inceleyerek bu anlatının taşıdığı geçmişi, tasavvur ettiği geleceği, ve günümüzde 
bir dışlama yöntemi olarak kullanılışını araştırmaktadır. Bu konuyu nostalji kuramı, 
geçmişin farklı şekillerde işlenebilir olması ve mutenalaşma literatürü ve çeşitliliğin hem 
yüceltme hem de yıkma yöntemleriyle kullanılabilen bir pazar aracı olarak açısından ele 
almaktadır. Proje etrafında gelişen söylem gazete makaleleri, pazarlama materyalleri, 
politikacı ve geliştiricilerin ifadeleri vasıtasıyla çözümlenmektedir. Projenin, hayal edilen 
bir geç Osmanlı semtinin son dönemlerindeki küresel kapitalist tüketim ve Avrupa 
çeşitliğine bir geri dönüş öngördüğünü öne sürmekteyim. Bu geri dönüş, mevcut durumda 
istenmeyen insan topluluğunu dağıtmak ve yanlış şekilde iskân edildiği düşünüldüğünden 
ortadan kaldırılması gereken ‘suistimallere’ dair fiziksel emareler gösteren yerel yapı stoğu 
cephelerinin yıkılıp, seçici bir şekilde yeniden inşa edilmesi ile gerçekleştirilecektir.  
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CHAPTER 1. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
On April 8
th
, 2016, a five-story apartment building in Istanbul’s central Tarlabaşı 
neighborhood collapsed. It was empty due to renovation at the time, and nobody was hurt. 
In the moments leading up to the collapse neighbors had noticed loud cracking sounds 
coming from inside, allowing them to clear the street. This early warning had the added 
benefit of allowing the collapse to be caught on camera. In one video, standing in the dust 
cloud moments after the building came tumbling down in front of him, the person filming 
can be heard to lightheartedly proclaim, “yes dear viewers, another building has 
collapsed!”1 (İstanbul'da 5 katlı, 2016). Indeed, collapsed buildings in the neighborhood 
are not uncommon; less than two months earlier another building had collapsed just a few 
blocks away. While most newspapers essentially published the videos without commentary 
(the name of the neighborhood perhaps speaking for itself), the English-language Daily 
Sabah attempted to provide some context for foreign readers who may not quite 
understand. After four short sentences explaining briefly that a building had collapsed and 
that nobody was hurt, the article continues:  
 
The building was located in the area also known as Tarlabaşı, which 
houses Istanbul's oldest multi-storey buildings, with some dating back 150 
years old. Most buildings located in the area are currently empty due to an 
extensive urban renovation effort initiated by Beyoğlu Municipality, 
whereas several other buildings had collapsed in recent months.  
The neighborhood was populated by Istanbul's Greek and Christian 
communities who left the city in final years of the Ottoman Empire and 
early years of the Republic.  
                                                 
1
 Throughout this thesis, all translations from the Turkish are mine unless otherwise noted. Articles originally 
appearing in English are reproduced as written. 
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The neighborhood was initially populated by poor immigrants from 
Turkey's countryside, who often could not afford to reparations for the 
buildings. After a newly-built avenue separated the neighborhood with the 
rest of Beyoğlu district in early 1980's, added with the rapid change and 
deterioration of entertainment business in the area, the neighborhood soon 
made a reputation as the crime center of Istanbul with poor living 
conditions (Empty Building Collapses, 2016). 
 
Despite ostensibly being about the collapse of a building, more than half of this article 
consists of a summary of the history of the wider neighborhood. The collapse becomes not 
just an accident that happened during a renovation, but rather the almost inevitable 
conclusion of a series of events stretching back more than a century. History, as it so often 
does, gets dragged into the present in order to make a point about something that’s 
happening now. 
The buildings that had collapsed in recent months shared a common feature: they 
were not in an area undergoing urban renovation.
2
 The renovation that might have “saved” 
them is the Tarlabaşı 360 urban renewal project, a massive public-private development in 
the middle of a listed historical neighborhood that claims to update the building stock for 
modern needs while holding on to the historical fabric of the neighborhood. On the 
occasion of the previous building collapse, two months earlier, İstanbul governor Vasip 
Şahin had visited the site and proclaimed that incidents like that one show just how 
necessary the “urban and cultural transformation” of Tarlabaşı was (Kaya, 2016). One sees 
clearly how an urban transformation could indeed benefit a neighborhood filled with old, 
collapse-prone buildings (let us ignore for the moment that both collapsed buildings were 
potentially weakened by the major renovations they were undergoing at the time). But 
governor Şahin thinks a cultural transformation is necessary too. To explain why, it is 
helpful to hear what I will call the legend of 360.    
My summary of the legend is based on an academic article titled “Gentrification in 
Istanbul,” written by a professor in a prestigious urban planning department in Istanbul 
(Ergun, 2004). She presents a brief summary of gentrification in a number of historical 
neighborhoods in Istanbul, in each of which she runs through the same four-part narrative. 
                                                 
2
 The author’s use of “whereas” is unclear, but based on Daily Sabah’s reporting on the neighborhood I am 
making the assumption that the collapsing buildings outside the renewal site are being contrasted with those 
within. 
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The story goes like this: first, somewhere in the late Ottoman past, non-Muslims and 
Muslims live together happily in peace and harmony. There is true civilization and true 
cosmopolitanism, and artistic and culinary expression reach unparalleled heights. Then, 
suddenly, the non-Muslims mysteriously leave, taking their civility and culture with them 
and leaving their beautiful and Western apartment buildings to rot. But a fate worse than 
rot awaits. Soon the dearly departed are replaced by all sorts of undesirables: uncivilized 
peasants from Anatolia, homosexuals, Gypsies, transvestites, immigrants from Africa and 
the Middle East, etc. These people, finding copious empty housing in unbeatable locations, 
move in. However, they neglect the beautiful apartment buildings they now live in and 
bring down the value of the neighborhood; these buildings “following the architectural 
traditions of western culture, [were] considered strange by the migrant groups who largely 
came from a rural background. In time, Beyoğlu was transformed into a slum area” (396). 
Finally, the area is “discovered” by local and foreign (that is, “cosmopolitan”) artists, 
intellectuals, journalists, architects, etc. who “save” it by restoring the historical buildings 
and opening cafes, restaurants, bookshops and art galleries, eventually removing all trace 
of the previous migrant owners. In the case of the neighborhood Tünel, the author portrays 
one art gallery owner single-handedly ridding the neighborhood of crime! At last the 
neighborhood is rescued, and it begins to host highbrow cultural events: “new life was 
observed in Beyoğlu, manifest most obviously with the organization of the Istanbul Film 
Festival” (397). Thus, over the course of one hundred years or more the neighborhood 
comes 360 degrees from highbrow cosmopolitanism to barbarous squalor of homogeneity, 
and back again. 
Though my telling of the legend is based here on an academic source, it is echoed 
in countless places around the city: in advertisements, guidebooks, political discourse, 
novels, in the minds of many of the city’s residents, and even in the name of the Tarlabaşı 
360 urban “renewal” project. In a very broad sense it can even be said to be factually 
“correct,” at least as far as the movement of populations is concerned. It also points to 
some of the key issues driving the debates surrounding history, heritage, and the 
reevaluation of the late-Ottoman city. Indeed, the second phase identified above, in which 
the once-cosmopolitan neighborhood falls as undesirables move in, is the catalyst not just 
for the later nostalgic intervention, but for a radical change in the understanding of the 
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past. The article also betrays a great contradiction in its own theory: for a number of 
neighborhoods, Ergun bemoans the loss of “diversity” and yet she, like so many others, 
fails to acknowledge the new kind of diversity that emerged in its place. Instead, the 
newcomers are treated as unrefined criminals to be removed. The urban renewal project 
being undertaken in Tarlabaşı proclaims itself to be honoring the history of the 
neighborhood and its buildings, and in so doing calls upon that history as a justification for 
displacing the population currently living there. In the following pages I will take a close 
look at this narrative of lost cosmopolitanism, exploring the pasts it summons, the future it 
envisions, and the ways in which it is used as a tool of exclusion in the present. 
 
 
 
1.1 Thesis Structure 
 
 
The rest of this introduction situates the thesis in the wider theoretical framework 
of nostalgia, gentrification, urban aesthetics, and neoliberalism; while I will deal with some 
specific manifestations of these theories in Turkey, the purpose of this introduction is to 
give a more general background, which will be tied to specific developments in Turkey in 
chapter two. It then delineates the limitations of this study, before ending with some details 
about the neighborhood as it exists today, as well as a summary of the Tarlabaşı 360 
project’s history. 
Chapter two aims to give a background on the urban development of the 
neighborhood, and situate the Tarlabaşı urban development project in its historical and 
discursive position. Because the renewal project focuses excessively on the architecture of 
the neighborhood and presents itself in part as a preservation project, I explore the 
architectural development of the neighborhood, and the evolving ways the buildings there 
have been used and understood. Drawing both on academic work (in social history, history 
of art, and sociology), and on select primary sources (literature, film, and internet sources) 
I trace the ethnic and physical changes of the neighborhood, in addition to the evolving 
ways in which those changes themselves are perceived and remembered. Since the popular 
understanding of Tarlabaşı is tied in with that of Beyoğlu as a whole I focus on the wider 
district more generally, but wherever possible try to examine the ways in which Tarlabaşı 
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differs from, or contributes to, the understanding of Beyoğlu. Since the attitude towards 
old buildings has shifted over time and reflects dominant ideas both about who should live 
in the city and how it should be inhabited, I spend some time following the history of 
historical preservation in Istanbul. The current understanding of what preservation means 
is connected to how the “renewal” project is intended to function, and therefore the chapter 
also tries to explore some of the dominant ideas in Istanbul today around heritage 
architecture and the “true” essence of the city (culturally, ethnically, architecturally, 
historically), and how those things manifest themselves in urban planning. I also try to 
explore some of the ways in which desirable neighborhoods are presented in the city today.  
Chapters three and four engage directly with the actors promoting and 
implementing the project. Chapter three looks at three newspapers (as well as some 
additional sources) to observe the ways that the project tries to justify its implementation. I 
place a particular focus on historical justifications for renewal, as well as the three major 
emotions that the project plays to: fear, embarrassment, and hope. The chapter also 
addresses the debates around who gets to decide what the neighborhood should be like, and 
in particular the municipality’s conception of its own role in shaping both the physical 
urban fabric and the lives of the people who live in it.  
In chapter four I engage in a primarily visual analysis of the old website for the 
Tarlabaşı 360 urban renewal project. I have chosen to conduct a visual analysis because the 
project relies heavily on the visual markers of a perceived cosmopolitan past to justify 
itself as a historical preservation/restoration project, and uses these visuals to advertise 
itself as a simultaneously global and local site of late capitalist consumption. I look at how 
the developer has chosen to depict both the buildings of the neighborhood, and the 
inhabitants and street life of the neighborhood during three distinct moments (named 
yesterday, today, and tomorrow) in the neighborhood’s history. I argue that each of these 
moments represents a specific idealized version of how the neighborhood can be used; 
more specifically, how it should or shouldn’t be used. Borrowing a phrase from its own 
marketing campaign, I analyze the images of the streets of these moments as 
representations of “concept streets” which portray a specific lifestyle that is connected to 
the past of the neighborhood in various ways.  
 6 
The conclusion poses some questions for further research, and suggests some 
things to look for as the first stage of the project nears completion.  
 
 
 
1.2 Academic Background 
 
 
Andreas Huyssen (2000) has pointed out that in the years leading up to the start of 
the new millennium, memory emerged as a central concern in the West. While most of the 
twentieth century was concerned with a modernism that focused on the future, today that 
focus “has shifted from present futures to present pasts” (p. 21). This explosion of 
nostalgic feelings coincided with the global shift towards a neoliberal economic system, 
which restructures urban spaces as spectacles of consumption. In order to be attractive to 
global capital, cities seek to emphasize their locally unique attributes (including the urban 
social and cultural environments). AlSayyad (2000) remarks that “because culture has thus 
become increasingly placeless, urbanism will continue to be an area where one can observe 
the specificity of local cultures and their attempts to mediate global domination.” Harvey 
(p. 2001), on the other hand, argues that by doing this the homogenizing power of global 
capital then begins to erase those differences. 
Svetlana Boym (2001) identifies two types of nostalgia, which she terms restorative 
and reflective. Restorative nostalgia “attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost 
home,” in contrast to reflective nostalgia which “thrives in algia, the longing itself, and 
delays the homecoming – wistfully, ironically, desperately” (p. XVIII). Josh Carney (2014) 
has challenged the exclusivity of those two categories, arguing that, while these categories 
make sense theoretically, the way nostalgia is activated in individuals is often a complex 
mix of the two. He notes that even texts, by virtue of having a range of interpretations, 
cannot be classified as strictly restorative or strictly reflective; rather, in his work he tries 
to explore how those texts work nostalgically on their publics. Following Geertz’s (1973) 
concept of culture as text, and mindful of his claim that societies contain their own 
interpretations (p. 453) I understand the buildings and spaces of the neighborhood as texts, 
and explore the ways in which those spaces are read nostalgically by the developers and 
the state.  
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In my analysis I am mindful of Renato Rosaldo’s (1989) conception of imperialist 
nostalgia, which he defines as “people mourn[ing] the passing of what they themselves 
have transformed” (p. 108). Because most nostalgia is so innocent, he argues, imperialist 
nostalgia is able to “transform the responsible colonial agent into an innocent bystander” 
and to “capture people’s imaginations and to conceal its complicity with often brutal 
domination” (p. 108). In the Turkish case, imperialist nostalgia manifests itself in 
mourning for the non-Muslim populations that were either killed or forced to leave by the 
state, a process that was encouraged by the new Muslim bourgeoisie – the same groups 
that are now celebrating and mourning the culture that was destroyed. My investigation 
into the discourse around Tarlabaşı complicates this analysis in that the narrative presented 
about the renewal project introduces two major violent transformations, rather than one, the 
second of which is actually justified as an undoing of the first. Because of this, there is 
increasing discussion of the role of the state in the first period of destruction, and by 
recognizing this to a small degree the project’s developers are able to subtly criticize the 
government of the previous era, even as they obscure their own complicity in the first 
destruction. At the same time, the appeal to nostalgia is used to justify another violent 
transformation of the very same neighborhood, and again serves to elide the destruction 
that will be caused. 
Rosaldo also brings up the possibility of nostalgia as a Western-based feeling or 
even one that exists exclusively (or originally) in the West (p. 109). In the Turkish context, 
for example, Orhan Pamuk has been accused of producing an orientalist nostalgia in his 
examinations of Istanbul (for example, Işın, 2010, p. 41). Various actors in my research 
accuse others of being orientalist, so it is worth noting two major points made in Edward 
Said’s study of Orientalism (1978). First, he notes that orientalist scholars understood the 
east as both titillatingly exotic, and stuck in a sort of unchanging past. Secondly, by 
creating an academic and popular discourse the West was able to appropriate the power of 
representation from the very people it was studying.  
İpek Türeli (2010, p. 300) notes that when nostalgia becomes a dominant feeling, 
“visual and literary depictions of the city become important sites through which to imagine 
and consume bygone times.” These visual depictions include architectural spaces, and 
today in Istanbul one finds a café dedicated to Ara Güler and his evocative black and white 
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photographs, taverns whose soundtracks feature the plaintive strains of Rebetiko music, 
and new mosques using classical Ottoman forms.
3
 In the same way, urban renewal 
projects, which developed such a bad reputation in the United States for erasing the 
historical fabric and scale of neighborhoods, are marketed and justified as ways of 
retrieving and reviving a distantly remembered past. Paralleling Huyssen’s remark that the 
past has replaced the future as the dominating reference for the present, Boym (2001) 
points out that, far from the dominant trends of the mid 20
th
 century, “the urban renewal 
taking place in the present is no longer futuristic but nostalgic; the city imagines its future 
by improvising on its past” (p. 75).  
Throughout the thesis I keep a focus on the buildings themselves as sites for the 
consumption of nostalgia. While doing this, I have kept in mind Alois Riegl, who in 1928 
noted that the creators of old buildings were looking to  
 
satisfy certain practical or ideal needs of their own, of their contemporaries 
and, at most, of their heirs, and certainly did not as a rule intend to leave 
evidence of their artistic and cultural life to future generations, then the term 
‘monument,’ which we nevertheless use to define these works, can only be 
meant subjectively, not objectively. We modern viewers, rather than the 
works themselves by virtue of their original purpose, assign meaning and 
significance to a monument (Riegl, 1996, p. 72). 
 
The buildings in question are being given a completely different meaning now than they 
had when they were first built. Moreover, in the case of Tarlabaşı the buildings are actually 
being physically reconstructed with an eye not just to create a suitable space of 
consumption for the early 21
st
 century, but also to write “in stone” a specific understanding 
of the neighborhood’s past. The new neighborhood will attempt to signify something quite 
different, and attempts to create its own nostalgic feeling in the people who encounter it. 
Two terms deserve elucidation here. ‘Urban renewal’ is a state-initiated program of 
redeveloping large parts of impoverished, often densely built-up urban neighborhoods by 
acquiring the properties in question, relocating the inhabitants and businesses, demolishing 
the buildings, and replacing them. This is the kind of process Jane Jacobs (1964) argued 
against in the United States, leading to the preservation of historical, mixed-used 
neighborhoods that ironically, due to their well-preserved historical urban fabric, later 
                                                 
3
 On Rebetiko as a signifier of lost cosmopolitanism, see Koglin (2008).  
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became sites of gentrification. My understanding of ‘gentrification’ follows Smith (1996, 
p. 30), who describes it as the process “by which poor and working-class neighborhoods in 
the inner city are refurbished via an influx of private capital and middle-class homebuyers 
and renters – neighborhoods that had previously experienced disinvestment and a middle-
class exodus.” In the American context, the neighborhoods that are gentrifying fastest now 
are those that escaped the urban renewal craze of the mid twentieth century, since their 
historical housing stock is the very thing that appeals to the re-urbanizing white middle 
classes.  
Darryl Crilley (1993) notes that historical diversity is used by developers not to 
appeal to a diverse market, but rather to bolster the attractiveness of developments to a 
particular set of non-diverse customers. The homogeneity of the gentrified neighborhood is 
hidden within the appearance of diversity expressed through visual cues such as heritage 
architecture. Shaw (2000) notes that ‘diversity’ becomes “simply another consumable 
attribute for affluent tastes, and rather than appealing to a range of types of people, only 
those with the necessary attributes (such as cash, class and/or ethnicity) have membership 
in such a niche market” (p. 68). Speaking of gentrification in Australia, she writes that “at 
the heritage-gentrification nexus there are socio-cultural processes at work that privilege, 
and dispossess, and there are also nostalgic yearnings that are part of these processes… 
Migrant and indigenous heritages […] are not simply forgotten, they are actively denied 
through the production of specifically coded forms of heritage(s) that reinforce and 
consolidate already empowered groups” (p. 59). Similarly, urban renewal in contemporary 
Beyoğlu appears to coincide with Boym’s concept of restorative nostalgia. The 
reconstruction of the lost neighborhood, however, obscures the presence of the residents of 
the neighborhood today, reinforcing hierarchies of class and race. While much of the 
discourse around Tarlabaşı could be equally applied to any poor neighborhood, there is one 
particular aspect that sets it apart; namely its architecture. As Müller (1999) argues, 
musealisation is an increasingly widespread phenomenon in urban settings, as historical 
cities convert their older districts into touristic or shopping centers.  
The use and control of urban space has emerged in recent years as one of the 
primary sites of contestation in cities around the globe. Starting with Jane Jacob’s (1964) 
attack on destructive, top-down modernist planning principles, urban theorists have 
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stressed the importance of the public’s right shape the cities they live in (Lefebvre, 1968; 
Harvey, 2008). In Turkey, the Gezi Park protests of 2013 were triggered by a conflict 
around who gets to decide about how urban space is shaped, and what kind of shape it 
should take. The protesters were demonstrating against the tendency of the state to decide 
unilaterally how the city should look, a tendency that indeed has been a constant 
throughout modern Turkish history. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) was 
trying to replace a park, which had been designed in the early republican period to 
modernist specifications, with a reconstructed Ottoman barracks that would have held a 
mall. Because the “Islamist” AKP was trying to build an Ottoman-style building while the 
protesters were defending a republican space, the protests have sometimes (and often 
contrary to their own stated goals) been analyzed as a conflict between nostalgic Kemalism 
and nostalgic neo-Ottomanism. Edhem Eldem (2013), however, points out that both of 
these nostalgias hearken back to a period of authoritarianism and thus share more in 
common than what divides them. Many protestors, instead, were demanding a more 
democratic process of urban planning. 
Cihan Tuğal (2009) writes about the ways in which the radical Islamism that gave 
rise to system-friendly political movements like the AKP, while initially critical of the 
neoliberal democratic system, has been absorbed into it. It is also clear that the major urban 
transformations undertaken by parties in opposition to Kemalist reforms have nonetheless 
followed the forms laid out by the republican governments (Gül, 2009). What is happening 
now is, though couched in the language of neoliberalism and ethnic plurality, in fact the 
same homogenizing, top-down, large-scale reshaping of urban spaces and urban society 
that has been going on since the beginning of the republic. The AKP government, while 
positioning itself in opposition to some aspects of Kemalist ideology, in fact embodies a 
very similar style of social engineering. 
There has been a significant amount of work on the urban renewal project in 
Tarlabaşı in recent years. A recent urban planning thesis traced the ways in which 
architectural modifications to the neighborhood changed (and after the urban renewal 
project, will change) the options for movement, and the availability of third spaces (Göker, 
2013). A sociology thesis found that individuals’ behavior and socialization have been 
profoundly influenced by the project (Parker, 2013). Other works have focused on the 
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social and economic conditions in the neighborhood today (Mutluer, 2011; Yılmaz, 2006), 
and resistance against the project (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010; Ünsal and Kuyucu, 2010; 
Dinçer, 2011). 
Since most work on Tarlabaşı has focused on the human impact of the project and 
resistance against it, my study takes a different approach by exploring how exactly the 
state/developer wants the people in the neighborhood to act and to function, and how they 
justify that. Still, it is worth keeping in mind that all of the ideas and depictions I am 
dealing with in the present work are views from outside and from above, who nonetheless 
are trying to absorb the lived experiences of the historical neighborhood into a state-
centered narrative of consumption and modernity.  
 
 
 
1.3 Tarlabaşı 360 Location and History 
 
 
Tarlabaşı is not an official administrative neighborhood but rather is the unofficial 
name given to an area made up of six mahalles (the smallest administrative unit): Bostan, 
Bülbül, Çukur, Kamer Hatun, Kalyoncu Kulluk, and Şehit Muhtar. These occupy a roughly 
square area bounded by Tarlabaşı Boulevard to the south (uphill), Dolapdere Avenue to the 
north (downhill) and two streets running from the ridge to the valley, Taksim Avenue to 
the east and Ömer Hayyam to the west. Tarlabaşı Boulevard is only a few blocks north 
(downhill) from İstiklal Avenue, Istanbul’s main pedestrianized commercial strip. The 
pedestrianization of İstiklal led to the widening of Tarlabaşı Boulevard in the 1980s and 
the destruction of many historical apartments in the neighborhood (see Bartu, 2001). Those 
that remained were marked as a historical conservation area in 1993.  
A nine-block section of the conservation area was approved as an urban renewal 
area in February 2006 under the management of the Beyoğlu municipality, who decided 
that it would be developed through private sector investments (Dinçer, 2011, p. 54). The 
company selected was GAP İnşaat, a branch of the Çalık Holding conglomerate, whose 
CEO at the time was Berat Albayrak, the son-in-law of then-prime minister (now 
president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Albayrak has since become the minister of energy and 
natural resources). The owners were offered either 42 per cent of the surface area of their 
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existing property, or full monetary compensation for the property’s current value (p. 59). 
The project includes 278 plots, approximately 70% of which are listed historical buildings. 
Three of the blocks front Tarlabaşı Boulevard, and the rest are located on the side streets 
sloping downhill. The project will have two office buildings and six residential buildings, 
which will incorporate the facades of certain historical row houses (although most of the 
facades will be reconstructions rather than preservations), while the interiors of the blocks 
will be demolished and rebuilt as unified structures in a contemporary style.  
Erdoğan is heavily associated with the project, and his picture appears prominently 
in publicity videos and billboards, including a large billboard at the site itself and on the 
website (see, for example figure 22). Perhaps because of the degree to which the AKP, 
both on the national and local level, are publically affiliated with the project, public 
attitudes towards the project tend to coalesce around party lines (see chapter 3). Because of 
the extent to which the government is associated with the project through advertising and 
discourse, I understand the version of history presented by the project as one that meets 
with the approval of the ruling party. With that in mind, we turn now to the various 
understandings of the neighborhood’s past.  
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CHAPTER 2. 
 
HISTORY OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD 
 
 
 
 
History is not simply everything that happened in the past; rather it is a carefully 
curated selection of events and moments in the past that historians, teachers, politicians, 
developers, tour guides, advertisers, authors, journalists, artists, and everyone else 
assemble to tell specific stories (Carr, 1964; Lowenthal, 1985). Since the understanding of 
history is colored by the needs and ideologies of specific times and populations, certain 
aspects of the past receive more or less treatment depending on who is writing history, and 
when. Nationalist historians have been keenly aware of this, since the process of inventing 
a nation requires an exclusive past that the nation can claim as its own (Anderson, 1983). 
Since such clear-cut concepts as “pure nations” are impossible to observe in the historical 
record, nationalist historiography (like any historiography) picks and choses which areas to 
focus on. “The essence of a nation,” says Ernest Renan, “is that all individuals have many 
things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things” (Renan, 1947, p. 11). As 
the writers of history have shifted their ideological positions, or as events in the present 
have caused changes in historical needs, the specific things to be forgotten (or 
remembered) have also shifted. So it comes as no surprise that in telling the history of 
Tarlabaşı, different aspects of the past have been emphasized or ignored at different times, 
and by different tellers. The stories being told about Tarlabaşı’s history today are 
profoundly influenced by the gentrification project, which in turn is dependent on (some 
of) those stories for its own justification.  
Beauregard (1986, p. 47) notes two processes that are important for the creation of 
a gentrifiable neighborhood: First, “the creation of gentrifiable housing,” and second, “the 
creation of prior occupants who can easily be displaced or replaced.” My goal in this 
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chapter is to trace not just how these buildings and occupants got there and remained there 
until the present, but also to ask why those particular buildings are considered gentrifiable 
at this particular moment, and why those occupants are considered replaceable. 
Gentrifiable housing is gentrifiable because of an appreciation for both the artistic and 
historical value placed on a building, but the popular appreciation of that artistic value rests 
on a particular understanding of the building’s history. Açıkgöz (2014) notes that in the 
early republican period “arguments on whether a monument had to be preserved could be 
built on several factors such as the period and the patron, hence the memories the 
monument evoked” (p. 184). In this chapter I seek to explore how the memories invoked 
by the buildings in Tarlabaşı have been understood, both to highlight the changing views 
of minority history in recent decades, and to explore some of the undertones pervading the 
current discourse around the modern and future use of the neighborhood.  
 
 
 
2.1 The Development of Late Ottoman Beyoğlu 
 
 
Cities have long been shaped by the forces of power and ideology. The famous 
silhouette of Istanbul’s so-called “historical peninsula” is the product of deliberate 
planning choices by its rulers, who sought, through urban planning, to shape the city into a 
physical expression of their imperial and spiritual self-image (Necipoğlu, 2005). The 
nineteenth century saw profound physical changes in urban centers throughout Europe, as 
the great powers rearranged their capitals to express new concepts of modernity, 
rationalism, and radical break with the past; this is typified by Eugène Haussmann’s 
reorganization of Paris under Napoleon III, which thrust wide, straight boulevards through 
the dark, narrow, and winding streets of the city’s medieval core (Harvey, 2003). In their 
colonial cities, Europeans desiring to physically and symbolically present themselves as 
separate from, and superior to, their colonial subjects developed entire quarters based on 
modern urban planning and architectural ideas outside those cities’ historical cores. 
Istanbul in the nineteenth century did not have the economic means to remake itself in the 
grand manner of Paris or Vienna. While grand redevelopment schemes were occasionally 
drawn up, implementing them proved unfeasible; instead the state redeveloped 
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neighborhoods here and there as fires periodically cleared out sections of the dense urban 
fabric.  
Other than this piecemeal restructuring, the major changes to the urban landscape 
in this period were not state-implemented, despite the fact that most historical scholarship 
has tended to focus on state intervention. It is only recently that historians are starting to 
focus on the individual actors, many if not most of them non-Muslim, that are responsible 
for creating the urban landscape that has survived to the present (see Girardelli 2007; Ozil 
2013 and 2015). While never colonized, historians have argued that Istanbul nevertheless 
developed more along the lines of the colonial model of a physically, architecturally, and 
socially divided city, with Europeans and “Europeanized” Ottomans choosing increasingly 
to live across the Golden Horn in European-style apartment buildings. Unlike a true 
colonial city, however, Pera never became a uniformly European neighborhood physically 
or demographically, and even though it was repeatedly selected to be the showcase modern 
district of the city, infrastructural deficiencies persisted throughout the Ottoman period 
(Çelik, 1993, p. xvi).  
While the walled settlement of Galata has been inhabited since Byzantine times and 
working-class neighborhoods had later sprung up along the shores of the Golden Horn and 
the Bosporus, the hillsides of Pera remained covered primarily by vinyards and cemeteries. 
On the ridge, along what would become the Grand Rue de Pera (today’s İstiklal Avenue), 
these rural areas began to be replaced in the seventeenth century by the residences of the 
Dutch, French, English, Genoese, and Venetian ambassadors (Çelik, 1993, p. 30). These 
embassy buildings were built in wood in local styles; Paolo Girardelli (2007) notes that up 
until the nineteenth century there appears to have been no real visible distinction, either in 
exterior form or interior organization, between Muslim and non-Muslim residential 
architecture. This began to change after a fire in 1831, starting with the construction of a 
new Russian embassy that was so much more prominent and grandiose than its 
surrounding neighborhoods that people arriving in Istanbul from the sea are said to have 
mistaken it for the Ottoman palace (Girardelli & Neumeier, 2016). As the embassies 
started competing with each other to build more prominent and magnificent edifices in the 
European style (the British embassy was even based on Lord Elgin’s home in Scotland), 
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they were joined by prominent local families, many of them non-Muslim, who began to 
relocate from crowded neighborhoods in the old city to hilltop mansions in Pera.  
The new buildings constructed in Galata and Pera represented a desire to create a 
particular urban form that was identified with European modernity; a high-rise mixture of 
apartments, theatres, department stores, arcades, offices and hotels. The most prestigious, 
including many embassies, churches, schools, and commercial buildings, were in 
neoclassical, Art Nouveau, neo-gothic, or orientalist styles, largely conforming to 
European tastes at the time; apartment buildings had interior layouts arranged along 
corridors (see Girardelli 2007, Ozil 2013, Kolonas 2005). Inside these new buildings, and 
especially in the structures along the Grand Rue, were European-style shops featuring 
imported goods from Europe, and often kept by Greeks, Italians, Frenchmen, and other 
non-Muslims. While many of the shopkeepers and shoppers were non-Muslim, members 
of the Muslim Ottoman elite were also known to patronize the stores along the Grand Rue, 
such as the French-style Levantine-owned LeBon pastry shop, which featured large French 
tiles depicting the four seasons in Art Nouveau style, and a pastry oven that was imported 
from France (Özlü, 2013). These imported French details in a European-style building 
allowed the Ottoman elite to participate in a more authentically European / Western / 
Modern luxury lifestyle, and to help make the case to other European countries that the 
Ottomans were worthy of Great Power status (See for example Boyar & Fleet, 2010, 
chapter 8). This view of late Ottoman Beyoğlu – an implicitly4 cosmopolitan setting for 
luxurious Europeanizing consumption – is the one that has come to dominate in the 
marketing of the area, and is the understanding that we will encounter again in later 
chapters.
5
 
                                                 
4
 Without bothering to identify their nationalities or ethnicities (presumably assuming it will be obvious), 
Boyar and Fleet provide names of shop owners like Cosma Vuccino, Boğos Torkulyan, Papadopulo and 
Leonlides, and Mayer. They identify the Europeanness of the department stores and shops too solely by 
names such as Bon Marché, Pazar Alman, and Hristodulos bookstore (Boyar & Fleet, 2010). This same tactic 
of having recognizably non-Muslim names as an indicator of diversity is used by the Tarlabaşı 360 website 
(see chapter 4). 
5
 Census numbers support this understanding. In 1885 Istanbul as a whole was 44 percent Muslim and 15 
percent foreign. However the sixth district, which at the time was composed of Pera, Galata, and Tophane, 
was fully 47 percent foreign and 32 percent non-Muslim Ottoman, with only 21 percent Muslim. In contrast 
the three districts within the Roman walls south of the Golden Horn were 55 percent Muslim and only 1.5 
percent foreign (Çelik 2003, p. 38). 
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As the neighborhood quickly expanded downhill from the ridge, it eventually 
merged with the uphill expansion of the working class neighborhoods below, leading to a 
continuously urbanized area whose inhabitants’ socio-economic status descended more or 
less in tandem with their elevation. As one descended the hillside into the neighborhoods 
of Tarlabaşı, Kasımpaşa, Dolapdere, and Tophane, one encountered the petit-bourgeoisie, 
the working classes, and the urban poor. Ayşe Ozil (2015) argues that Tarlabaşı in this 
period represented a new kind of urbanity with a mixed socioeconomic population, falling 
somewhere between the luxury neighborhoods around the Grand Rue and the working-
class neighborhoods below. Some middle class residents, among them doctors, lawyers, 
and architects, built large apartment buildings in the neighborhood. Other lower and lower-
middle-class residents provided services for the wealthier inhabitants higher up, working 
as tailors, waiters, petty merchants, and prostitutes. She notes that there was particular 
effort paid on the part of the prestigious Greek schools to encourage the poor Greek 
families of Tarlabaşı to send their children to school, which met with some success.  
Some tailors living in the neighborhood appear to have been involved in the 
management of brothels; indeed, Beyoğlu as a whole had been known for prostitution 
since at least the conquest (Mansel, 1995, p. 14). By the late Ottoman period this  
profession showed the same elevation-linked economic stratification as the overall 
neighborhood. Those that worked on Abanoz (Halas) Sokak, very near the Rue and famous 
for its brothels to this day, catered to an upper-level clientele. The brothels in Tarlabaşı, 
appear to have had a dodgier reputation; Ozil notes they were known as frequent sites of 
shoot-outs.  
Housing in Tarlabaşı reflected its middle and lower-class populations. In June 1870 
a fire destroyed more than three thousand houses, including much of Tarlabaşı and the 
entire northern side of the Grande Rue between Taksim and Galatasaray. A master plan 
was drawn up to remap the streets in the burned area to feature squares and a greatly-
widened Tarlabaşı Boulevard which would have rivaled the Grand Rue, but due to its 
prohibitively high cost the project was scrapped, and the neighborhood was rebuilt largely 
on the same streets as before the fire, with only minor street-straightening (Çelik, 1993). 
However, the new buildings that were built along those streets were in a different style, 
either row houses or a type sometimes called “Tanzimat boxes” (Girardelli, 2007). This 
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hybrid building type flourished in the working-class neighborhoods around Pera, including 
Tarlabaşı in the period after the fire. Since the local administration had recently made 
construction in brick or stone (kargir) mandatory, the new buildings were less fire-prone 
and expected to survive much longer than their wooden counterparts. While all buildings 
required state permission to be built, their construction was mostly undertaken by private 
individuals. On the whole they featured regular, simple, and symmetrical facades with 
some classical elements, but incorporated some local designs like bay windows and 
centralized plans of rooms branching off a central hall. While art historians have tended to 
emphasize the hybrid nature of these buildings, in the popular discourse the “European” for 
“foreign” aspects of the buildings would come to be emphasized (Çelik, 1993).  
 
 
 
2.2 The Neighborhood in the Nationalist Imagination 
 
 
Çelik’s concept of Ottoman Pera as a pseudo-colonial district set in contrast to what 
is sometimes termed the “historical peninsula” (or even “the Muslim city”) has been a 
popular trope for centuries. Tursun Bey in the 15
th
 century, Evliya Çelebi in the 17
th
, Lady 
Mary Wortley Montagu in the 18
th, Ahmed Cevded Paşa in the 19th (Boyar & Fleet, 2010, 
p. 320) – all of them mention a vast difference between the neighborhoods to the north of 
the Golden Horn and those to its south. In the earlier Ottoman period this difference caused 
Beyoğlu to be seen negatively by local Muslim writers, but positively by Europeans, who 
saw it as a place of “liberty;” later, however, as the Ottoman threat to Europe decreased, it 
came to be seen by Europeans as a sort of cheap imitation of the West, a sentiment which 
was shared by many later Ottoman writers. 
Nationalist historiography looks upon cultural and ethnic diversity with suspicion. 
Since the nation-state bases its legitimacy on a homogeneous population, diversity is seen 
as a threat to sovereignty, and those groups that don’t fit into the national narrative start to 
be perceived as “foreign.” In Turkey “Turkishness” was originally conceptualized 
primarily in religious terms, and only secondarily in linguistic terms; the Greek-Turkish 
population exchange of 1923, for example, resettled people based solely on religious 
grounds, regardless of what language they spoke (Hirschon, 2003). Because of this focus 
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on religion, efforts at demographic engineering were primarily directed at the various non-
Muslim groups who had lived alongside the Turkish-speaking Muslims for centuries, but 
were now increasingly perceived as potential enemies. Geographies that were associated 
with non-Muslim populations thus became suspect themselves.  
In light of this it is hardly surprising that the buildings, streets, and spaces of Pera 
and Galata were perceived very negatively by Turkish Nationalist writers of the late 
empire and early republic. Arus Yumul (2010) argues that the neighborhood represented an 
intermediate category that was “‘both inside and outside’ the newly constituted borders of 
the Turkish Republic, a suburb that defied the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and thus 
symbolized the mixing of cultures” (p. 66). In an era of ideally homogenous nation-states, 
Pera presented a physical space that was the “center of decadence, estrangement, 
materialism, debauchery, moral depravity, artificiality, cosmopolitan degeneracy and of 
foreign cultural invasion” – or, as one writer put it, Pera was “a prostitute lodging in the 
bosom of Turkishness” (p. 67). Novels like Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu’s Sodom ve 
Gomore show corrupt and decadent Levantines, foreigners, and Ottoman bureaucrats 
naturally at home in the landscape of Beyoğlu.6 The theme of the neighborhood as a site of 
prostitution is echoed again in Ömer Seyfettin’s (2002) story “The Collection,” written in 
1914 and set very near the site of the Tarlabaşı 360 project. It introduces a rich, cultured, 
francophone, and modern Levantine family who turn out to be high-class prostitutes who 
pimp out both mother and daughter to the narrator, and whoever can pay their astronomical 
price. It is certainly no accident that they live in an elegant modern apartment building with 
a Greek doorman, down the street from the Armenian-owned Tokatlıyan Hotel, in the heart 
of Pera.  
These negative views manifested themselves violently across the country over the 
course of the twentieth century, and Beyoğlu was no exception. Beginning with a massive 
state-initiated boycott of foreign and Ottoman non-Muslim businesses in 1911 (Üngör and 
Polatel, 2011, p. 61), a process of economic and demographic engineering began that 
would all but rid Istanbul of its former style of diversity. In 1915 the prominent heads of 
the Armenian community were rounded up and deported, setting in motion events that 
                                                 
6
 A number of works have been written about the nationalist depictions of Pera in this period, including 
Boyar and Fleet (2010, chapter 8), Özpalabıyıklar (2000).  
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would lead to the complete decimation of the Ottoman Armenian community (p. 65). 
While Istanbul Greeks were exempt from the exchange of populations between Greece and 
Turkey, due to emigration during the Greco-Turkish War their population had been 
reduced to 100,000 by 1924 (Hirschon, 2003, p. 8). Those who remained faced bouts of 
violence in the following decades, most notably the events of 6 and 7 September 1955, in 
which Greek-owned businesses were attacked by state-sponsored mobs after false reports 
of a bomb attack at the birthplace of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Thessaloniki (Kuyucu, 
2005, p. 361). A large number of Greeks were also forced to leave during the height of the 
Cyprus conflict in 1964 when the Turkish government cancelled the Turkish citizenship of 
all dual Turkish-Greek nationals, their property confiscated by the state or left vacant 
(Mills, 2010, p. 28-9). The “citizen speak Turkish” campaign publically discouraged the 
use of languages other than Turkish, further emphasizing the minority status of other 
ethnic groups and leading to public harassment, in Istanbul especially of Jews, who 
historically spoke Judeo-Spanish (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 25). The Wealth Tax of 1942 was 
levied most heavily against non-Muslims in Istanbul, resulting in the confiscation of large 
numbers of minority properties by the state, and the emigration of large numbers of 
minority citizens, particularly Jews (Aktar, 2013). The Turkish government was also 
involved in the 1934 anti-Jewish pogroms in Thrace, which contributed to a general sense 
of insecurity among the Jewish population in Turkey; many have since moved to Israel 
(Bayraktar, 2006). Taken together these actions by the state (though carried out with larger 
or smaller degrees of popular support) had the effect of nearly eliminating the non-Muslim 
population of the city and the country; today Turkey is home to approximately 3,000 
Greeks, 50,000-60,000 Armenians (Karimova & Deverell, 2001, p. 11), and 23,000 Jews 
(Minority Rights Group International, 2016). 
The removal or destruction of the non-Muslim communities created a social 
vacuum since, with very few exceptions, there had been no native Muslim bourgeoisie that 
could replace the departing minorities. By distributing their confiscated properties and 
movable assets to new Turkish Muslim businesses and individuals, the state was able to 
decide who would step in to take the place of these departed minorities. This marked the 
beginning of the heavily centralized, étatist regime that endeavored to transform not just 
the economic and demographic nature of the country, but nearly every aspect of life to 
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match its idealized view of a modern Turkish nationalist society (Keyder, 1994, p. 45-53). 
From the abolition of the Caliphate and the move of the capital to Ankara, to laws 
governing proper headwear and which alphabet to use, the state went to great lengths to 
create an appearance of rupture with the Ottoman past.  
One powerful way the state illustrated this desired rupture was through urban 
planning, which in the early and mid 20
th
 century focused on destroying the “traditional” 
fabric of the city. Whereas in the late Ottoman period interventions were limited to areas 
destroyed by fire, in the second half of the 20
th
 century massive boulevards began to slice 
through the city, radically changing the character and connectedness of many 
neighborhoods (Gül, 2009). Modernizing reforms in urban space aimed to shatter the 
mahalle pattern of close social relationships centered around a neighborhood imam; in 
other words, to liberate the individual from “the idiocy of traditional, community-oriented 
life” (p. 79). Adopting the language of modernism, these changes were described as 
respecting Turkish civilization, as opposed to recreating the orientalist fantasies of 
Europeans: “we would like to see Istanbul regularized according to such aesthetic 
parameters that no traveler could find a fault, not in the mystic atmosphere Pierre Loti was 
fond of” (Niyazi Ahmet, quoted in Açıkgöz, 2014, p. 182). Even after the one-party period 
ended the government continued to follow urban planning principles established in the 
early republic, plowing boulevards through central districts (including Tarlabaşı) and 
destroying huge swathes of the historical city (Gül, 2009). 
Ümit Fırat Açıkgöz (2014) argues that because of the continued presence of non-
Muslims in Istanbul, and the lingering threat posed by Greek irredentism, the major focus 
of historical preservation efforts in the early republic was on Islamic Ottoman monuments. 
Turkish/Islamic monuments were seen as a justification for the existence of Turks in the 
region, and thus an argument towards ownership of the land by Turkey. Monuments by 
Sinan and other Ottoman artists were seen as important by Turkish nationalists, since they 
“confirm our right to exist in this country” and “in addition to being solidified and 
indestructible evidence of our existence in this country, the Turkish monuments possess 
political significance that is more substantial than their scientific and aesthetic values” (p. 
181). These monuments also served as counterpoints to orientalist claims of inferiority by 
Europeans, and as evidence of the existence of Turkish civilization. It’s notable, however, 
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that preservation focused primarily on the form of the buildings, rather than their function; 
Topkapı Palace and Hagia Sophia were both protected as museums rather than a palace and 
a mosque, becoming sites of rupture between the “outdated” imperial and Muslim Ottoman 
state and the self-proclaimed modern secular republic. Many charitable foundations too 
were divided and their various properties given over to new uses, even as the buildings 
themselves were maintained. Stripped of their former uses, these buildings could be seen 
as markers of Turkish architectural genius, rather than symbols of the Ottoman state.  
The overwhelming focus of preservation was monumental architecture, and indeed 
a regulation of 1933 specified that monuments were to be surrounded by a ten meter strip 
of open land, paving the way for demolitions of domestic architecture (Güçhan and Kurul 
2009, p. 27). Furthermore, the emphasis on building a new, modern state tended to 
override interest in the preservation of anything other than these monuments (Açıkgöz, 
2014, p. 178). When domestic architecture received attention at all it was only wooden 
“Turkish” houses that were studied, and even then not so much for preservation as to 
provide a library of forms that later nationalist architecture could draw on to create an 
authentically Turkish modern style. This idea was advanced particularly by Sedad Hakkı 
Eldem, but it attracted few followers; for most architects of the early to mid 20
th
 century, 
international styles were more attractive (Altınyıldız, 2007, p. 294). These buildings were 
often concrete squares and displayed a distinct lack of the detailed surface ornamentation 
that decorated the façades of the previous era (Bozdoğan and Akcan, 2013). The biggest 
architectural changes, however, would come in the second half of the century. 
 
 
 
2.3 “Invasion” and Subsequent Reassessment 
 
 
The second half of the 20
th
 century saw massive rural to urban migration 
throughout Turkey. The population of Istanbul exploded, with the vast majority of 
migrants coming from rural areas. Many of these migrants settled in the neighborhoods 
that the non-Muslims had left, including Tarlabaşı, taking over their abandoned houses. At 
first, confiscated non-Muslim properties were transferred by the state to a new landlord 
class; the first group of rural migrants, mostly from the Black Sea coast and central 
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Anatolia, benefited either by purchasing buildings from their official caretakers or by 
extra-legally appropriating them and retroactively becoming legal owners. Since the 1980s 
they have been joined by a large number of internally displaced Kurds fleeing the violence 
in the southeast. These internally displaced people settled in Tarlabaşı in such large 
numbers that by the 2000 census southeastern Anatolians made up the largest group in the 
neighborhood. The most common property structure in Tarlabaşı today is de jure 
ownership. In 2008 the neighborhood was approximately 75% tenants, 20% owners, and 
5% occupiers. Partly because of the neighborhood’s proximity to Taksim Square and 
İstiklal Street, two of the city’s main commercial and touristic destinations, the majority of 
the population works in low-end service jobs (Ünsal and Kuyucu, 2010, p. 57). 
Interestingly, as these new groups began living in those houses they also started to 
fill the discursive gap left by the non-Muslims, that is, neighborhoods like Tarlabaşı that 
had at one time been stigmatized for their non-Muslim populations were now equally 
stigmatized for their migrant populations. However, while the physical spaces that were 
stigmatized remained the same, the human target of distain shifted to the new populations. 
As the memory of the non-Muslim groups became more distant it also started to transform 
into something positive, a transformation that extended to the physical and cultural 
remnants of the vanished populations, including architecture. 
The following statement by the photographer Ara Güler
7
 indicates the attitude of 
long-time Istanbul residents towards the new populations, and points to those populations 
as a likely source for nostalgia towards the previous populations: 
 
“The real population of Istanbul is one million. Today, 13 million people 
live here. We have been overrun by villagers from Anatolia who don't 
understand the poetry or the romance of Istanbul. They don't even know the 
great pleasures of civilization, like how to eat well. They came, and the 
Greeks, the Armenians and the Jews – who became rich here and made this 
city so wonderful – left for various reasons. This is how we lost what we 
had for 400 years.”8 (Kinzer, 1997) 
 
                                                 
7
 Güler’s work from the middle of the twentieth century has itself become a focus of nostalgic consumption 
(Türeli, 2010) 
8
 Güler himself is Armenian, but in the article he says that he has always considered himself “just a Turkish 
person like any Ahmet or Mehmet” (Kinzer, 1997) 
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Many other long-time Istanbul residents echo his sentiment. In Istanbul Orhan 
Pamuk’s major thesis is that the essence of Istanbul is an all-pervading sense of loss and 
nostalgia; he echoes Güler (whose work features prominently in the book), writing that 
Istanbul has been “overrun” by “wave after wave of immigrants,” resulting in a city where 
“for the last 150 years, no one has been able to feel completely at home” (Pamuk, 2005). 
Put another way: 
 
Istanbul was conquered again in the 1950s, five hundred years after Sultan 
Mehmet’s victory, by the Anatolian invasion. These people brought their 
own civilization to my city, instead of trying to adapt to ours. I am sure that 
none of these people have ever been to an exhibition in their lives, all they 
think about is getting enough money for a summer house. We became a 
nation of lahmacun eaters. Fifty years ago no one in Istanbul knew what 
lahmacun was, or, if we did, we called it pizza. (quoted in Bartu, 2001, p. 
138) 
 
These quotes show that, for a certain segment of the population (those that Pamuk 
might identify as Istanbullus) it is precisely the vanished non-Muslim populations who are 
now understood to constitute Istanbul’s true cultural identity9. Pamuk’s assertion that the 
very essence of the city is a melancholic longing is based on this vanished culture. And 
interestingly, these examples all tie population change to concrete cultural issues (housing 
style, cuisine, exhibitions) as well as fundamental conceptions of what the city means 
(romance, civilization, essence). Öncü (2007) notes that for the city’s migrant population, 
“the glorification of Istanbul’s ancient history – along with its aesthetic preservation and 
display in segregated tourist spaces – has become the new exclusionary rhetoric of the 
moment” (p. 208). 
The period in which Istanbul was ignorant of lahmacun is precisely the time in 
which the non-Muslims were being removed; while the departures and arrivals are not 
directly related to each other, it’s easy to see how they could become connected in the 
popular imagination. It is also noteworthy that so much of the discourse around the recent 
immigrants revolves around taste, and their supposed inability to appreciate the “superior” 
                                                 
9
 Of course, the imagining of the non-Muslims as the true character of Istanbul in contrast to the immigrant 
“Anatolians” overlooks the fact that most of the non-Muslims present in the city in the late Ottoman period 
were in fact migrants themselves (see Ozil, 2013 and 2015).  
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urban culture of Istanbul, from architecture to food. Although the Istanbullus scold the 
newcomers for not assimilating to Istanbul culture, the opposite is also true. “While Pamuk 
laments the disappearance of a specific Ottoman diversity in the city, he fails to observe, 
let alone rejoice, in the appearance of another, creative and energetic diversity created by 
its outsiders and strangers” (Işın, 2010, p. 42).  
This sentiment often has a distinctly political bent to it. Ayfer Bartu (1999) notes 
that people’s feelings about the destruction of the historical buildings in Tarlabaşı to build 
Tarlabaşı Boulevard in the 1980s was tied to their political positions. Today is no different. 
In a highly personal article that appeared in The Guardian soon after a suicide bombing on 
İstiklal Avenue10 in March 2016, the author (a foreigner living in Istanbul) noted the 
street’s “sheer cosmopolitan glory” and claimed that the attack was directed at that 
cosmopolitanism (Crabapple, 2016). A number of the comments on the article, however, 
opined that Istanbul’s cosmopolitanism was “long gone.” One of them noted that the  
 
image of cosmopolitanism that global capital and travelers bring to the 
select neighborhoods of the city is a mirage… it’s a industrial/post-
industrial mess of a city filled with migrants from conservative heartland of 
Anatolia, the kind of people who gave despot Erdogan his first major office, 
the kind of people who have nothing to do with the cosmopolitan culture 
that made Istanbul so great… [the attack] is a continuation of a path that the 
Istanbulites willingly chose nearly a century ago. 
 
This commenter, and others on the article, seem, in fact, to make a connection between the 
loss of Istanbul’s old diversity and the rise of the AKP.  
The upsurge of publicly expressed nostalgia for the late Ottoman city, however, is 
not only a product of elitism, but also coincides with global trends. AlSayyad claims that 
the modern discourse of globalization obscures a movement towards “cultural 
differentiation.” He argues that “as the nations of the globalized world order become more 
conscious of their religious, ethnic and racial roots…they will continue to seek forms and 
norms that represent these subidentities, even if these send confused messages to a global 
audience” (AlSayyad, 2001, p. 13). The focus on the Ottoman heritage of these 
                                                 
10
 The author referred to İstiklal as both the Broadway and the “Champs Élysée” of Istanbul – the first of 
many streets we will see compared to that Parisian boulevard, and one of many spelling variations. 
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neighborhoods, and especially the non-Muslims that used to live there, can be understood 
as a way of emphasizing the specifically local character of the increasingly globalized city. 
Similarly, tourism today has started shifting away from the monumental to focus 
more on “local heritage” (Shaw, 2005, p. 61). The New York Times travel section, for 
example, frequently mentions the antique shops of Çukurcuma and the backstreets of 
Kadıköy (Fowler, 2016), and Orhan Pamuk’s Museum of Innocence, tucked away on a 
back street and offering a decidedly non-monumental view of the city’s recent past, is a 
favorite of the “I’m a traveller not a tourist” crowd. Indeed, of all the short-term visitors 
and residents I’ve met in the last four years, as many were reading Orhan Pamuk’s 
memoir-cum-history Istanbul as were reading conventional guidebooks. Guidebooks 
themselves have picked up this strain. The upscale Monocle Travel Guide series’ volume 
on Istanbul, which recommends staying, eating, and shopping at some of the city’s most 
expensive and exclusive places, includes essays urging Karaköy to keep its small business 
character, and arguing that the hüzün that pervades the city is not just paralyzing but 
productive too; the buildings once inhabited by the Greeks and Armenians (the example is 
of course Beyoğlu) are now occupied by “new minorities,” with neighborhoods like 
Cihangir now “home to French, Italian and British writers and artists, drawn in part by its 
disheveled and haunting charms” (Grove & Lord, 2015, p. 73). It is telling that the 
guidebook, seeking to appeal to an elite global audience, highlights as cosmopolitan the 
European expatriates in a gentrified (and notoriously insular) neighborhood. 
Neighborhoods like these offer the perfect combination of global (Western) comforts and 
local charm; “even though tourists are hardly ever willing to put up with the local living 
standards, a taste of authenticity on the building facades” is welcomed (Bozdoğan and 
Akcan, 2013, p. 229).  
Müller (1999, p. 365) notes that our view of the city we live in is more influenced 
by the tourist gaze
11
 than we often realize, and that while certainly stronger while visiting 
other places, doesn’t totally vanish when we return home. A localized understanding of the 
demands of the tourist gaze is illustrated by Daily Sabah’s travel section, which seems to 
                                                 
11
 See Urry (1996) 
 27 
cater to foreigners living or visiting Istanbul.
12
 In an article about the hip, gentrified 
Kadıköy neighborhood of Yeldeğirmeni the author invites us to imagine “a traditional and 
typical Ottoman neighborhood, with churches, synagogues and mosques” that represent 
“the cultural mosaic that is inherent in Istanbul's history.” The neighborhood, we are told, 
features century-old apartments with “bay windows on the front façade and the interiors 
opening up onto a central courtyard of greenery and trees” that is teeming with art galleries 
and has become “one of the most popular hotspots for expats in Kadıköy” (Ergil, 2014). 
This article explicitly connects the architecture with former local diversity and, like the 
Monocle guidebook, with current international diversity. At the same time, we are told that 
“tradition and bohemia meet in the most creative of ways, which Turks definitely have a 
knack for” reminding us of the nationalist context of this diversity.  
 
 
 
2.4 Constructing Diversity 
 
 
As opposed to the early Republican period, in which non-Muslims were still 
present in the city and their buildings were therefore seen with suspicion, once those 
minorities were effectively eliminated the perception of them began to change. Amy Mills, 
in her work on Kuzguncuk, finds that the cosmopolitanism that people today perceive to 
have existed in the Ottoman past could only be celebrated after the Jews, Armenians, and 
Greeks who supplied this cosmopolitanism had been removed. This gives those who 
remain the power to represent the erstwhile non-Muslim other through photographs, music, 
architecture, and other means. For example, a current resident of Kuzguncuk can point to 
the Armenian church sitting side by side with a mosque as proof that Muslims and non-
Muslims cohabited peacefully, ignoring the fact that the congregation of the 19
th
 century 
church was replaced by the congregation of the 20
th
 century mosque (Mills, 2010). The 
voices of those who fled often paint a less-rosy picture of the so-called cosmopolitanism of 
those times (see Mills, 2008), but since they have been effectively removed from the 
                                                 
12
 In one article titled “Living as a Hipster in Istanbul” (Arsıya, 2015) they take the tourist desire for a 
simultaneously international and local “authenticity” to its logical extreme. 
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Turkish context they are now represented not through their physical presence or their 
stories, but rather through their buildings.  
 Because the last years of the Ottoman Empire are now long enough ago to not be 
remembered directly, and because the vanished non-Muslims no longer hold the power of 
to represent themselves, the Ottoman past becomes “malleable” and thus subject to “great 
dispute and admiration” (Carney, 2014, p. 19). Ayşe Öncü (2007) argues that for the 
affluent upper and upper-middle class, intellectuals, and the corporate elite, Istanbul’s late 
nineteenth century Belle Epoque offers a similar promise to that of Istanbul in the future 
global era; rather than existing as a distant historical event, it represents a “timeless 
moment bringing together a constellation of elements (a mixture of intellectual freedoms, 
political emancipation, economic vitality and cultural creativity) and tying them to the 
present through the idea of 'multiculturalism'” (p. 238). At the same time, she writes, as the 
Islamist movement has been in local and national power, it has shifted to a neoliberal, 
religious-nationalist establishment, and “'Islam' has been opened to consumption, 
continuously performed and displayed as part of the city's 'multicultural' past and present” 
(p. 244). Ayfer Bartu (1999) argues that for Islamists, Istanbul before the modernizing 
urban transformations holds a kind of pristine beauty; the inward-looking mahalles, each 
with their own character, are now something to be celebrated. Thus the two groups often 
portrayed as vying against each other for cultural and political power in Turkey (the 
Secularists and the Islamists) have both been able to locate in the late 19
th
 century a 
moment of nostalgic glory. 
Indeed, some of the most highly sought-after neighborhoods today are former non-
Muslim neighborhoods. Some, such as Kuzguncuk, Galata, Arnavutköy, and Cihangir, are 
well-established gentrified areas, which gentrified largely through the efforts of individual 
property owners. In contrast to the writers of the early 20
th
 century who saw the apartment 
buildings of Beyoğlu as sites of corruption and vice, it is those same buildings that drive 
the attraction to those neighborhoods today; real estate agents have learned that people will 
happily pay extra to live in a coveted “Rum evi.” Tolga Islam conducted interviews with 
gentrifiers in the Galata neighborhood in 2002, finding that they were highly educated, 
multi-lingual, and lived in small family groups, all unusual for the city as a whole. When 
asked to rank the factors that were most important to them in choosing to live in the 
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neighborhood, the most commonly emphasized aspect was living in an old house, followed 
by proximity to “cultural and leisure activities;” among the least important are affordability 
and “living side by side with lower status groups” (Islam, 2005, p. 132-3). The 
appreciation of these buildings, once seen as dens of sin and symbols of foreign 
penetration, is today a marker of cultural capital in Istanbul, so much so that migrants from 
the countryside are mocked for their perceived inability to live “properly” in a building like 
this. 
As the power of nostalgia to turn once-impoverished neighborhoods into fully 
integrated spaces of consumption has become more apparent the state has started to pay 
attention. State-sponsored urban renewal projects like Tarlabaşı serve to create more 
readily consumable areas both through creating a readily consumable atmosphere of 
cosmopolitan nostalgia and European modernity, and by creating a space for offices, 
luxury apartments, and global brands. In order to implement these plans, they started 
making new laws related to preservation, the most relevant of which was law 5633, passed 
in July 2005. It allows neighborhoods marked as conservation areas to be developed as 
urban renewal projects, either through restoration or by demolishing the structure and 
rebuilding it in a way that respects both the historical conditions of the buildings, and the 
development potential of the site. Municipalities are allowed to partner with private 
developers, or with TOKİ. While it uses language that appears to require public 
participation and mutual agreements with owners, on closer inspection “public 
participation” is no more than notifying residents of centrally made decisions, and 
allowance is made for expropriation if an agreement cannot be reached. The law has been 
used to justify a number of large-scale urban renewal projects in Istanbul, including the 
Tarlabaşı project. The first project to be completed, however, was the Sulukule project, 
which completely demolished a majority-Roma neighborhood and generated a highly-
visible opposition movement, which however was unable to stop the development (Dinçer, 
2011).  
State-led urban renewal projects in historical areas, like the Demirören shopping 
center and Fransız Sokak, are interpretations of the Ottoman past. They do not offer a 
literal replication of the Ottoman past, but rather infuse a contemporary frame with a 
nostalgic feeling to attract consumers. At the same time, however, they serve to reinforce a 
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certain understanding of Turkey’s past, and make an argument for its future. Girardelli 
(2007) attributes the focus on these specific buildings to the “collective realization that the 
Levantine heritage represents one of the few links with the past on the scale of the 
residential and urban fabric, in cities which preserved mostly outstanding monuments of 
older epochs” (p. 127). While this may be true, it is perhaps also the visual Europeanness 
of these neighborhoods (represented in part by their histories of diversity) that lead the 
state to focus on them. Müller (1999, p. 366) quotes a survey taken in Germany that asked 
what people imagine a city to have, the vast majority said a city should have a town hall, a 
church or cathedral, and a marketplace, and that these are the very things promised by 
tourist guides in all European cities. Beyoğlu, in fact, fits this description very well: it has 
churches, synagogues, pedestrianized shopping streets, a large square, European consulates 
and cultural centers, and even a beaux-arts town hall. The neighborhood, in this sense is an 
excellent site from which to advance claims of Turkey as an integral part of Europe. 
While the earlier republican era portrayed itself as European/modern by focusing 
on its own nationalism and modernism, the Europeanness that is being cultivated now is 
one of cosmopolitanism. This is in line with the global human rights regime and the 
European Union, which have increased their emphasis on protecting minority rights and 
celebrating multiculturalism. Marcy Brink-Danan argues that in Europe today the presence 
of Jews is used as a proof of cosmopolitanism and a rebuff to claims of intolerance by 
other groups, so much so that “to be a European city, it seems, is to ‘have Jews’” (p. 281). 
In light of this, she argues, Jews are “called upon” in Turkey’s EU negotiations to prove a 
“recognition of diversity” (p. 282). Beyoğlu has emerged as a primary site of performing 
Europeanness by virtue of its important Jewish history and general visibility, a fact she 
attributes more to the practical goal of arguing Turkey’s closeness to the EU rather than to 
nostalgia. Today in the Taksim metro station, frequently visited by tourists to the area, one 
encounters a series of large photographs depicting the history of transportation in Istanbul. 
In the first, labeled “advertisements in Tünel,” the advertisements in question are in 
Armenian, Hebrew, French and other European languages; the second, labeled “on the way 
to Kurtuluş,” shows a tram bearing the old Greek name for that neighborhood, Tatavla. In 
one of the sites most strongly associated with modernity (a metro) the city has chosen to 
illustrate its cosmopolitan past. 
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Historical preservation in Turkey today relies heavily on use value and newness 
value. Historical buildings are restored so thoroughly they look as if they were newly built 
(and in many cases they are, since “restoration,” especially for minor monuments like 
houses and barracks, often means being completely demolished and rebuilt). Masterpieces 
from the Ottoman classical age are getting glassed-in porches, machine-made wall-to-wall 
carpeting, modern windows, and fresh paint jobs
13
, all of which serve to keep the buildings 
up to modern and expectations, while removing the accretions of time and the signs of age. 
This restoration style is read negatively by many visitors from western Europe or 
(especially) North America, who expect a 500-year-old building to show signs of age; 
many people I’ve brought to the famous Süleymaniye Mosque have expressed 
disappointment that the building didn’t “feel old.” Uğur Tanyeli, a professor of the history 
of architecture, echoes this and points to an emotionally political reason for this: “In 
Turkey, the historical has to be brand-new and squeaky clean. So what is actually wanted 
is the illusion of history – It has to be historical, but it is not allowed to carry any baggage 
of the past, or any of history’s patina, there can’t be anything about it that creates unease” 
(Letsch, 2012).  
Religious properties that had been given over to other uses or abandoned in the 
early republican period are once again hosting Islamic organizations, many of whom are 
restoring the buildings as close as possible to their original forms. Walton (2010) notes that 
“the neo-Ottoman practices and representations” that these organizations utilize 
“participate in many of the same modes of publicness as Turkish secularism, even as they 
also call into question principal secularist presuppositions and emphases.” He also notes 
that the organizations are quietly critical of the secular state, but they prefer disengagement 
through the construction of separate pious spaces – it allows them to stay within the 
politics of civility in Turkish public sphere while they “decouple publicness from the 
assumptions and imperatives of Kemalist secularism” (p. 90). The renewal projects in 
Beyoğlu, I argue, are looking to implement a public consumerist space that is not tied to 
the Kemalist project, even while implementing the same top-down process. 
                                                 
13
 The sixteenth century Yavuz Sultan Selim Mosque, for example, features all of these things after its 
renovation 
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One form of the global reaction against modernism is the emergence of 
postmodernism as a trend in architecture, which in Turkey has led to an increase in the use 
of historicizing elements such as tile roofs, wide overhangs, and bay windows, even in 
suburban gated communities. One major characteristic of this change is a shift away from 
the rigidly demarcated planning zones of the 20
th
 century, to mixed-use development, 
which “has emerged as a recombination of work, dwelling and recreation in a single 
project, all arranged around consumption, namely retail shopping, which functions as the 
centerpiece and generator of neo-liberal economies across the globe” (Bozdoğan and 
Akcan, 2013, p. 207, emphasis mine). The fact that it is described here as a recombination 
is indicative of one of the reasons this style of development is so attractive to developers 
today. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DISCOURSE 
 
 
 
 
A man sets off to visit the past. Not today’s past, though, but the past of tomorrow. 
His task is to capture, with his camera, the faces of the men, women, and buildings who 
have no future in the streets where they now stand. From his starting point between an 
Ottoman mosque and a nostalgiafied shopping mall on 21
st
 century İstiklal Street, he walks 
down the gentle grade of Gum Tree Lane until, as he passes Hacı Abdullah Restaurant, he 
begins “to breathe the Tarlabaşı air” (Tatlıcan, 2014). Crossing the boulevard he stands 
under a rainstorm originating from the clouds of dripping laundry above him, and surveys 
the ancient (well, oldish) world in front of him; a world on the brink of extinction. The 
“reality” he sees there “hits [him] like a slap in the face” (ibid.). He and his camera wander 
the streets, enter some of the houses and businesses there, and even grab a drink at a blue-
tiled nightclub where an illiterate Roma singer ends the night with a heartfelt rendition of 
Ferdi Tayfur’s arabesque classic “Gurbetin Kahrını Sen Çekemezsin” (“the best moment of 
my Tarlabaşı shoot!”14 our man gushes). After learning so much about the soon-to-vanish 
neighborhood, he sums up his adventure with newfound understanding: “I would like to 
say, ‘there’s nothing to fear here. When you are going to Taksim you can comfortably park 
your car here.’ But what a pity that Tarlabaşı, the attraction center of one age, is the crime 
center of today.” Well, he admits, “I don’t know what the statistics say but that’s the view 
from outside.”  
Indeed, after filming a documentary and interviewing residents in the 
neighborhood, all İsa Tatlıcan can say is, essentially, “I’m no expert, but that place is 
                                                 
14
 These photos are in fact stills from a documentary film that Tatlıcan directed. While outside the scope of 
this thesis, the film presents the same narrative seen here, and it does so with the help of experts and 
residents, and liberal usage of sad music. The video can be seen on YouTube here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_DlszQ9VErA.  
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probably pretty unsafe.” The captions under his photographs describe what he observes 
and give facts about the neighborhood, but the text is written like a travel report, as if the 
author is venturing into a foreign land. In contrast to the official photographs of the 
development project (see chapter 4), Tatlıcan enters the houses and businesses in the 
neighborhood. Nevertheless, no real effort is made to tell the stories of the people living 
there beyond some large generalizations. He doesn’t mention any resident’s desires to stay, 
or uncertainties about where they will go; instead he claims unfeelingly that with the 
coming urban renewal project, “the 150-year-old neighborhood and its inhabitants are 
silently (sessiz sedasız) saying goodbye to Istanbul.” Goodbye to Istanbul, as if they are 
sailing off for greener pastures, or simply vanishing into the pages of history. 
Tatlıcan and his photographs, which appeared in the popular newspaper Sabah’s 
online version, will serve as a guide for this chapter, leading us through the official 
discourse about the neighborhood, seeing buildings and people as outsiders see them, and 
even venturing into people’s homes and businesses (legal or, more often, not) without ever 
stopping to listen to their stories. Unlike in the following chapter I am not concerned here 
with a visual analysis of the series itself, but rather will treat it as a jumping-off point to 
discuss some of the wider themes that circulate about the neighborhood, its history, the 
people in it, and the future.  
My analysis in this chapter is based primarily on articles from four newspapers, all 
of which I accessed online: two Turkish-language publications, Sabah and Cumhuriyet, 
and two English-language ones, Daily Sabah and Hürriyet Daily News. I selected Sabah 
because it is close to the ruling AKP government and tends to present a very favorable 
view of the renewal projects. Cumhuriyet represents a more classical Turkish secular 
perspective, often critical of the ruling party and historically close to the CHP. In light of 
Müller’s thoughts on the tourist gaze, I have also chosen to look at the two main English-
language dailies of Turkey, Daily Sabah and Hürriyet Daily News.
15
 Since these two 
newspapers are clearly targeted at a foreign audience, I thought it would be interesting to 
examine how these projects are presented to readers who may be less familiar with the 
                                                 
15
 My initial plan was to take as a second English-langauge source Today’s Zaman, which would have added 
a third ideological perspective to the analysis. With the government takeover of that publication, however, its 
archive became difficult to access. Deciding to stick with the English-language theme, I settled on Hürriyet 
Daily News instead, although its editorial position is not as far from Cumhuriyet as Today’s Zaman would 
have been.  
 35 
debates within the country. I decided to look at both newspapers since the total number of 
articles produced in English is low (Daily Sabah returned only three results, one of which 
was a translation of a Turkish article). 
For all of them I searched for articles that contained the word “Tarlabaşı.” Due to 
the large number of articles I have focused in particular on articles from January 1
st
, 2010 
to December 31
st
, 2011, representing the time in which construction was beginning on the 
project, as well as articles from January 1
st
, 2015 to May 31
st
, 2016, as the first phase of 
the project was nearing completion. However, I also skimmed the headlines of articles 
from the years in between, and have used articles related to pertinent events (as when the 
project “won” an award in 2013; see below).16 
The chapter draws most heavily from the Turkish and English versions of Sabah. 
This reflects my interest in how the government and developers try to justify the project, 
since the majority of articles in Cumhuriyet and Hürriyet Daily News that dealt with the 
project in detail focused on opposition movements against it. However, reading those two 
newspapers was especially helpful for showing two things. First, that a lot of the anxieties 
about the neighborhood that the pro-development forces activate are present across the 
board. Secondly, they served to highlight some of the aspects of the neighborhood that the 
supporters of the project won’t mention, even though they could potentially help their case 
with conservative readers. The biggest example of this is the almost complete silence on 
the existence of the neighborhood’s large transgender population. Hürriyet Daily News 
made one passing reference to transgender residents in the neighborhood (see below), 
while neither version of Sabah mentioned them once in the period I looked at. Cumhuriyet 
ran a couple of articles about transgender sex workers that mentioned Tarlabaşı, although 
only one of them was explicitly about sex workers in the neighborhood (Acarer and 
Yılmaz, 2014). Given Tarlabaşı Boulevard’s strong cultural identification as a location of 
prostitution and the neighborhood’s fame as the home of many trans people, the total 
silence of the website and the pro-government newspapers is particularly striking. It would 
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 Many (if not most) articles in all Turkish-language publications including the word Tarlabaşı are 
notifications of road closures on Tarlabaşı Boulevard, either due to weather, accidents, construction 
(particularly during the pedestrianization of Taksim Square), or protests. Since Tarlabaşı is located very near 
to Istanbul’s preeminent sites of protest (Taksim Square and İstiklal Street) a search for the name of the 
neighborhood presents a summary of major demonstrations; the Gezi protests in 2013 led to many articles, 
for example, and every year there is a spike in the days surrounding May 1
st
. Most of these articles mention 
the neighborhood only in passing. 
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appear that transgender people are so much of a taboo that they cannot even be mentioned, 
even to justify the destruction of the neighborhood.  
The chapter is divided into two parts. It begins with a section discussing the views 
of various actors about how much power the municipality should have, and the historical 
role the government has played in the neighborhood. Secondly I briefly explore three of 
the major emotions that outsiders feel about Tarlabaşı today (fear, embarrassment,17 and 
hope) and how the urban renewal project addresses them. 
 
 
 
3.1 A Municipality Does More Than You Think 
 
 
The first thing Tatlıcan tells us about the neighborhood is some history. After 
mentioning that minorities used to live there, he discusses their departure in detail: “the 
people still living in the neighborhood after the 1924 population exchange were forced out 
of the neighborhood by political events including the 1941 wealth tax, the 1955 events, the 
1964 forced migration and the 1974 war in Cyprus.” By referring to them as political 
events he makes a claim about the responsibility for the departures. Another column in 
Sabah is more explicit: “their shops were taken over by those who came in the wave of 
migrations that the planners of the 1960s foolishly encouraged” (Uluç, 2016). Tatlıcan 
continues, “The hole left by the departed minorities was filled first by migrants from 
Anatolia, then by Kurds whose villages had been destroyed, Roma, Africans, Syrians and 
other refugees. Together with the migrants came collapse.”  
These articles, along with the project’s website (see chapter 4) offer some of the 
most direct claims that the state was responsible for the transformation of the 
neighborhood. Even most academic articles (particularly those from urban planning and 
architecture departments) about gentrification and urban history in Istanbul gloss over 
these details. One implication of this claim is that, since the state is seen to have been 
responsible for the “fall,” it is the state’s responsibility to recover it. In Beyoğlu it seems 
the state agrees. 
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 Embarrassment that such a neighborhood could exist in the heart of the historical and touristic center of the 
city. 
 37 
Asked about the role of the Beyoğlu municipality since the Tanzimat era, Demircan 
gave a summary of the role of the local government in designing the city:  
 
It is possible to discuss a municipality in two main parts. First, a 
municipality is responsible for basic city works such as cleaning, lighting 
and garbage collecting. On the other side, defining the appearance of streets, 
functions of buildings, the image the municipality presents to visitors, are 
the most important job for us. When you think of İstiklal Street's historic 
atmosphere, it is the municipality that gave the street such an impressive 
look. In each period, a different style emerged and introduced another 
dimension to Beyoğlu. To illustrate, we encouraged the use of French 
windows at certain cafes and many others took it as an example later. A 
municipality does more than you think. You may compare it to a fashion 
designer or a life mentor, both of whom makes your life or appearance 
better. Municipalities shape your life. For a long time, municipalities were 
seen as organization that merely clean your street. However, these entities 
have a main mission which is to design schools, car parks, religious places 
and, more importantly, the identity of a city. The Beyoğlu Municipality has 
always been associated with culture and art, not with trade or industry. If 
you ask how the district has gained this identity, we should the go back to 
the times of Ottoman Sultan Beyazıt (Dark, 2015; emphasis mine). 
 
Demircan’s vision of the municipality is all-powerful, responsible for giving Beyoğlu not 
only its services but also its identity. The article discusses the creation of the sixth district 
in the late nineteenth century, and seems to indicate a sense of strong-municipality 
leadership since those days. Demircan’s view of urbanism reflects Boym’s observation that 
planning today “imagines its future by improvising on its past” (2001, p. 75). Speaking of 
Beyoğlu Municipality’s various renovation projects, he notes that the municipality has a 
principle of "designing for the future while sustaining our traditional roots," which means 
conveying “the message that new things continuously enter our lives, but we should use 
them to polish the past. In the restoration process, the past and the present supported each 
other” (Dark, 2015). This past, of course, is not the recent past, but rather that more distant, 
mythical past that was destroyed by the previous government. 
Cihan Tuğal (2009) finds the AKP mayor of the Sultanbeyli municipality planning 
the pedestrianization and aesthetic modification of a street, which was opposed by some 
tradesmen who have, he said, no “urban consciousness” or “aesthetic and architectural 
concerns,” but only “commercial concerns.” Another administrator notes: “If we change 
the physical structure, people's ideas will change” (p. 208). Just like Demircan, the mayor 
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has a concept of how the city should be, and anyone who has a different idea is selfish and 
holding the neighborhood back. This hearkens back to modernist planning schemes, even 
though the ultimate goal here is to create a neoliberal space of consumption rather than a 
space of Kemalist nationalism.  
Because the municipality is understood to shape the identity of the city, those in the 
government are frustrated and almost bewildered by the legal and political challenges that 
have been brought against them. People who oppose the government’s plans are referred to 
as istemezükçü,
18
 an old word that means something like “naysayer” but which carries 
implications of Janissary conservatives who opposed the modernizing reforms of the sultan 
in the nineteenth century. Demircan’s understanding of the istemezükçüs is that they are a 
“professional protest group” who 
 
comes out against every new development. They don’t want us to restore 
the Emek cinema which had been abandoned to its fate, or to restore the 
Atatürk Cultural Center, or rebuild the Gezi barracks, or reorganize Taksim 
square, or build the Taksim Mosque. They want us to just leave everything 
where it is to collapse. This is orientalism. These so-called intellectuals live 
comfortable lives and yet say to the poor people “don’t change your 
condition.” This is a psychological problem, an arrogant attitude (Öztürk, 
2013). 
 
Saying that these groups are orientalist recalls the early republican desire to create a 
modern, Western city instead of the orientalist vision of Pierre Loti (see chapter 2). The 
irony, of course, is that it is now the secular elite who is accused of orientalism (although a 
Hürriyet Daily News (Branding the ‘Istanbul Cool’, 2010) article points out that some 
tourists are also interested in the impoverished “reality” of the city).  
Local opposition to the project, for example individual voices, are trivialized or 
explained away. At a funeral in 2014 a man yelled at Demircan, “you destroyed my home! 
I hope you too sleep in this coffin!” Sabah quickly published an article claiming that they 
had learned that the man “had been paid one million Turkish lira for his home, which 
anyway he was using as a storehouse for illegal alcohol” (Öztürk, 2014). Nowhere on the 
pages of Sabah or any promotional material for the project are any negative words against 
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 Or sometimes the istemezük korosu, the “chorus of naysayers” 
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the project heard from residents. This is a great contrast to the other two newspapers I 
analyzed (see below).  
Even at the official level the voices of the inhabitants seem to be ignored. Kuyucu 
and Ünsal (2010) conducted interviews with officials which revealed that their idea of 
“participation” was the inhabitants’ acceptance of, or objection to the projects, after their 
official approval (which as we’ve seen is allowed by law 5366). Hürriyet Daily News 
noted that some people, such as Tayfun Kahraman, the chair of the City Planning 
Chamber’s Istanbul branch, have criticized the mayor for not addressing the social needs of 
the residents before starting the project, contending that the social problems there will 
simply be transferred to other areas. Demircan’s reaction shows him to essentially agree 
with this charge: “I am the mayor of Beyoğlu, thus I look at how I can remove problems 
from my district’s borders” (Şenerdem, 2010). Let us now examine who those “problems” 
might be. 
 
 
 
3.2 Fear 
 
 
Nearly everyone featured in Tatlıcan’s photo series is smiling, yet a sense of mild 
unease pervades. In one photo, taken from a distance, a young man is being searched by 
police. In another a shoddily-dressed man leaning backwards with narrowed eyelids and a 
telling grin seems to be high. Throughout the series the shells of buildings seem poised for 
collapse. And of course there is his comment about the neighborhood being the “crime 
center” of the city, quoted above. This sentiment is reflected in the general discourse 
around the neighborhood, which is often described as dark, desperate, inhabited by the 
poorest of the poor and with a reputation for crime. In the articles I analyzed, reports about 
crime dominate; drug dealers and users, harassment, dead bodies in suitcases, and other 
unpleasantries were widely represented. There were also periodic articles about collapsed 
buildings and fires. In fact, though all the newspapers, advertising materials, and other 
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sources I’ve found (both those included in this thesis and elsewhere), 19  fear of the 
neighborhood has been the dominant sentiment.
20
 
The government frequently uses the vulnerability of buildings to earthquakes as a 
reason to undertake urban renewal projects. This is not without merit; earthquakes have 
caused extensive damage and great loss of life in Turkey in recent years. Erdoğan has 
announced a massive nation-wide urban renewal project in large part using the 
vulnerability to earthquakes as an excuse. The president of one development company 
notes that people should not worry about the fact that companies like his are making a 
profit from the urban renewal projects around Istanbul (including Tarlabaşı), since the 
more important thing is that “60 percent of the buildings in this area are not earthquake 
resistant [so] in an earthquake we would potentially see a very great loss of life” (Plan 
Devletten İnşaat Özelden, 2011). In Tarlabaşı too the fear of earthquakes is frequently used 
as a justification for the destruction of the neighborhood: “Demircan asked whose heart, 
whose conscience could rest easy when Tarlabaşı is in this condition, and said, ‘if there 
were to be an earthquake in Istanbul today, would we find even two stones still standing on 
top of each other?’” (Kentsel Dönüşüm Başladı, 2010). The collapse of buildings in the 
neighborhood, as we have seen, has also been pointed to as a sort of proof that the 
structures are weak, and would probably not survive an earthquake, although as I noted in 
the introduction it is often buildings undergoing renovation that collapse.  
Both Turkish-language papers featured frequent news about drug raids. A raid in 
2014 involved police helicopters lending air support to a joint operation made up of forces 
from the organized crime, terror, intelligence, narcotics, public order, traffic, and special 
operations forces; “The searches conducted in the abandoned buildings of Tarlabaşı 
captured large amounts of ecstasy pills, heroin, and cocaine” (Somer, 2014). Additionally, 
there were frequent articles about visibly inebriated people threatening people, getting on 
busses, and generally causing trouble in the neighborhood. 
While not always explicitly negative, all of the newspapers and the project’s 
marketing materials portray the neighborhood as one of ethnic difference. Articles about 
the Roma, Kurds, Africans, and increasingly Syrians living in the neighborhood are 
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 See also Yılmaz (2006, p. 37) on the discoursive fear. 
20
 When I first moved to Istanbul I was warned many times by many friends, both local and foreign, to avoid 
Tarlabaşı. 
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common. These articles often emphasize the poverty and difficulty that these groups 
experience, and paint their lives as desperate ones. Tatlıcan’s series includes a photo of a 
BDP-sponsored Newroz sign hanging in the neighborhood (with no comment by Tatlıcan) 
and a photo of two “children from the southeast making the victory sign.”21 An article 
from Cumhuriyet spoke of authorities “hunting” for Syrian refugees who are living in the 
abandoned houses of the neighborhood, to be sent to camps if they are found (Çelikkan, 
2016). In fact, Cumhuriyet in recent years has featured many articles about Syrian refugees 
in Tarlabaşı, sometimes subtly connecting them to a danger of Islamic terrorism. Indeed, 
while not as explicitly stated as it is in the discourse around the Okmeydanı urban renewal 
project, the fear of terrorism is exploited in Tarlabaşı.  
The state continues to have a model of an ideal citizen, which it contrasts to those 
who are not considered “Turkish” either because of their ethnicity or because they refuse to 
act according to the values of an ideal citizen. These groups are stigmatized and become 
“disposable” in the eyes of the state. The geographical regions they inhabit are seen as 
dangerous and in need of securing, either by declaring a “state of exception,” as in the 
majority-Kurdish southeast, or implementing urban renewal projects, as in Istanbul 
(Mutluer, 2011). A 20-year resident of the neighborhood made this same point, noting, 
“there are very old buildings in Kurtuluş too. But they want to remove Eastern people from 
here” (Songün, 2010). Since Tarlabaşı is inhabited by groups that do not fit the model of 
an ideal citizen, either from the nationalist (correct ethnicity and behavior) or neoliberal 
(correct value) perspective, and it is located in one of the most central and desirable 
locations, it has proven to be an irresistible site for transformation. Demircan’s concept of 
a strong municipal government, coupled with public distrust of the population living in the 
neighborhood, gives him the power to undertake a project of this size. 
And it works. An article in Sabah from 2014 discussing improvements in various 
neighborhoods in Istanbul asks, “why have incidents in the neighborhoods that used to be 
nests of illegal organizations decreased?” The answer for Beyoğlu is, “in this region urban 
renewal is taking care of it” (Oktay & Kaya, 2014).  
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 The victory sign (also know, for example in the hippie town I’m from, as the “peace sign”) is commonly 
associated with the Kurdish movement in Turkey.  
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3.3 Embarrassment: Stuffing Mussels the Wrong Way 
 
 
The first person we meet in Tatlıcan’s photo series is, as the caption tells us, “a 
child mussel-seller.” The young man stands behind his tray, hands in his pockets, gazing 
off camera stoically (Tatlıcan likes this image; it appears, cropped of its surroundings, in 
the opening montage of the film from which these images come). Behind him is utter ruin: 
a fragment of a former ceiling is draped limply across its lot, bags of garbage sit on chunks 
of concrete, and in the distance stands a grey apartment building, its bands of black where 
once there were windows echoing our young mussel-seller’s striped t-shirt. Later in the 
blue-tiled nightclub we are offered a plate of these delicious stuffed bivalves, but lest our 
hunger get the better of us Tatlıcan warns: “in Tarlabaşı there are 150 unregistered 
(merdiven altı) stuffed-mussel producers” (Tatlıcan, 2014). In fact, mussels emerge as a 
theme in the discourse of the neighborhood. In February 2016 both Turkish-language 
newspapers published photo or video reports about a raid on a basement in Tarlabaşı where 
stuffed mussels, a popular street food in Istanbul, were being prepared in “stomach 
turning” conditions (Beyoğlu'nda Midye, 2016; Beyoğlu'nda Mide Bulandıran 2016).22 
The articles feature grainy images of dark-complexioned men in a damp basement 
surrounded by piles of mussels and stuffing. The Tarlabaşı 360 website also notes the 
prevalence of mussel-sellers in the neighborhood today. This is done in a section of the 
website lamenting the state of neighborhood today, and describing the geographic origins 
of the population living there (see chapter 4).  
While the focus on these delicious shellfish may seem almost humorous, their 
context suggests ethnic undertones. Most mussel-sellers in Istanbul today are Kurds from 
the southeast, particularly from Mardin. The Kurdish-inhabited part of the country is, 
however, landlocked,
23
 and therefore unlike lahmacun, stuffed mussels can’t be a marker 
                                                 
22
 To my admittedly untrained eye, the “stomach turning” conditions in which the mussels are being prepared 
don’t seem radically different from the kitchens of some restaurants I’ve visited around Istanbul. When I 
tried to find these articles gain at a later date and searched “mussel” in the website, a surprisingly large 
number of “mussel operations” came up throughout Turkey.  
23
 In Orhan Pamuk’s A Strangeness in My Mind two young Kurdish boys from Mardin have their hearts set 
on selling mussels in Istanbul; to them the fact that people from an inland city had cornered the market of a 
seafood treat is proof that people from Mardin are “exceptionally cunning and clever” (Pamuk, 2015). The 
municipality, it would seem, disagrees. 
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of the new “invading” culture that disregards the civilization of Istanbul. In fact, stuffed 
mussels are a historical local delicacy, one that is frequently associated with Istanbul 
Armenians; aside from the street, they are sold in Armenian delis to this day. This culinary 
continuity between Istanbul Armenians and the later Kurdish migrants parallels the wider 
process of “Anatolians” inhabiting the gap left by the departed non-Muslims. The 
embarrassingly incorrect way they inhabit the physical spaces and occupational spaces of 
those who may have lived in them are strongly connected in the pages of Sabah and the 
words of the developers.  
Both the English and Turkish language versions of Sabah posted articles in late 
September 2013 reporting that the Tarlabaşı 360 project had been awarded "Best 
Commercial Renovation / Redevelopment Project in Europe" at that year’s International 
Property Awards, which the Turkish-langauge article called the “Oscars of renovation” 
(Tabak, 2013). However, according to the award organization’s website the project was in 
fact awarded the “Best Commercial Renovation / Redevelopment Project Turkey,” while 
the Europe-wide award went to another property (“Class A Business Center” in Saint 
Petersburg).
24
 The “winning” project’s full-page description in the award committee’s 
annual booklet, clearly intended for a foreign audience, points to the embarrassing 
conditions of the neighborhood: 
 
These historical buildings were originally constructed by Levantine 
architects but later occupied by immigrants from East Anatolia. They 
brought with them their own culture and lifestyle and even kept livestock in 
the centre of the city. As they were unaware of the historical value of the 
properties, they also made alterations to them causing serious structural 
problems. Each storey and even every room was occupied by different 
families with unsanitary bathrooms added to each unit (European Property 
awards: 30). 
 
Regardless of which award was won, the papers and developers took the opportunity to 
gloat. Demircan announced at the award ceremony that “Tarlabaşı was Istanbul's poisoned 
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 The awards only take into consideration properties that self-submit, and which are limited to six per 
country per category. There was no runner-up in Turkey, indicating that Tarlabaşı 360 was likely the only 
project to apply, although the five-star rating it received is based on total points earned rather than rank. In 
Europe, Russia, Cyprus, and especially Turkey dominate the lists of both winners and “highly commended” 
properties. 
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princess. With this project, we are waking up Sleeping Beauty and introducing her to 
Istanbul residents" (Tarlabaşı, Avrupa'nın en İyi, 2013). 
More than once on our journey with Tatlıcan our attention is drawn to the buildings 
around us: a beautiful Rum interior staircase; two beautiful but hollow shells of former 
Rum apartments. While Tatlıcan, Demircan, and others claim to appreciate the beauty of 
these buildings, this is a quality they feel is not shared by their current residents. Tatlıcan 
claims these people have “lived in the buildings for years without paying rent and made no 
effort to maintain the buildings.” This is a common trope; Demircan, for example, claimed, 
“until now, no building in this area has been restored for 50 years. Now tens of buildings 
have already started to be restored in areas surrounding the project” (Şenerdem 2010).25 
Indeed, one resident reported that a municipal official had told her that the people in the 
neighborhood “came from their villages and occupied the abandoned buildings in 
Tarlabaşı,” exactly the discourse we are used to hearing about the neighborhood; the 
resident noted, “this is how they see us. They say we are occupying villagers. But I am 
paying 500 Turkish Liras a month rent here” (Songün, 2010). 
Demircan’s dream is to turn Beyoğlu into what he refers to as a “museum city” 
(Taş, 2012). One cannot help remembering Müller (1999), who discusses musealization as 
a strategy for transforming urban spaces into places of monumentalized pasts that attract 
the tourist gaze. The museum city he wants to make, however, is one without traces of age; 
in fact, he dismissed the istemezükçu’s criticism of another controversial urban renewal 
project by saying, “the Demirören Shopping Mall is pretty new and shiny. The ones who 
oppose the renewed building don’t know the past. Now it is like the original, but they still 
oppose it. They will love it when it looks old” (Beyoğlu mayor, 2012). 
The Demirören shopping center, however, is radically different than it was before 
the restoration, as a photograph hanging on the side of the building itself ironically proves. 
Tarlabaşı looks to be no different. Demircan countered claims that the project was 
destroying the architectural history of the neighborhood by noting that “some” of the 
buildings in the expropriation plan were set to be renovated, rather than demolished 
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 Many of the property owners in the area, however, contend that they have not received permission to 
renovate their homes for many years, and were thus forced to leave their buildings derelict. Others point out 
that even buildings that were restored “in line with [their] original style” are about to be demolished anyway 
(Songün, 2010). 
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(Şenerdem, 2010). He also notes that the plan will proceed in whatever way the council on 
monuments decides, thus seeming to give himself preservation legitimacy (Kentsel 
dönüşüm başladı, 2010). One local resident asked a logical question: “They will dig a hole 
for a four-story underground car-park. How can they do that without demolishing all the 
buildings?” (Songün, 2010). 
The municipality frequently argues that the buildings in the neighborhood are either 
abandoned or in poor condition. Explaining why the nine blocks in the project were chosen 
as the first phase of the development, he said,  
 
we specifically chose the 278 buildings in Tarlabaşı that were the most 
abandoned, the least densely inhabited, and that were ready to collapse at 
any minute. At any moment they could disappear forever. Let’s treat the 
neighborhood with the worst gangrene as soon as possible. We chose this 
neighborhood because we said, if we cure this place the remaining areas 
will quickly and enthusiastically improve themselves (Kentsel dönüşüm 
başladı, 2010).26  
 
The use of the medical analogy here, of a doctor curing its sick patient, seems to indicate 
that there maybe be some hope for the neighborhood yet. 
 
 
 
3.4 Hope: The Genie of the Lamp 
 
 
“Good things happen in Tarlabaşı too,” Tatlıcan happily notes as he shows us a 
small group of dark-haired boys playing violins. They are taking classes at the 
Tarlabaşı Community Center, a place frequently identified as a site of hope in a 
neighborhood of despair. The community center celebrated its 10
th
 anniversary in 2016 
with “year­long events focusing on multiculturalism and peace” (Altuntaş, 2016). The 
center aims to empower women and children through dance, music, art, and drama 
workshops, as well as literacy courses, seminars on rights, and legal assistance. 
Only one article from any of the newspapers seems to paint some internal aspects 
of the neighborhood in a genuinely positive light. An interview in Hürriyet Daily News 
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 At this time in 2010 he also claimed that 70 percent of the buildings in the neighborhood were empty, a 
claim that he would late back away from (and that his aids would claim was an “approximation” although the 
true number was nowhere near that high). 
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(Jozuka, 2011) with two foreigners, an anthropologist and a photographer, who are trying 
to “knock down Tarlabaşı prejudices,” discusses the sense of community that exists there. 
The pair have a blog (which as of 2016 doesn’t seem to have been updated for a couple of 
years) that celebrates the neighborhood.
27
 It talks about the sense of community there, the 
fact that transsexual prostitutes and “conservative” AKP supporters frequent the same 
cafes, and that an entire street had become worried when they didn’t see an old lady one 
day and joined together to find her (she had died). They also note that they are aware of the 
dangers of the orientalist gaze but that they think the blog is a good way to raise awareness 
of the neighborhood. 
Every other article about the neighborhood locates hope in the form of people from 
elsewhere who have decided to help out the population of Tarlabaşı. And these articles use 
terribly grim words to describe the place. The article cited above about the 10
th
 anniversary 
of the center notes that it is having trouble finding funding, and that the neighborhood is 
“host to many different cultures, migration­based adaptation problems, poverty, 
unemployment and illegal relationships” (note that “many different cultures” appears 
among a list of problems) (Altuntaş, 2016). One article carries the title “Turkey's 
Changemakers: Tarlabasi Community Center fuels hope amid poverty,” and notes that 
despite being walking distance from the “hip and happening” Istiklal, Tarlabaşı is “the 
center of deprivation, sorrow and helplessness” (Turkey’s changemakers, 2011). This 
“helplessness” of the neighborhood is another frequently emphasized point, serving to 
reinforce the idea that the people there can’t take care of themselves. Interestingly, even 
the coordinator of the Tarlabasi Community Center, Suzan Oktan, paints a picture of 
overwhelming despair from which people need saving: "their common ground is the 
culture they share, a culture of deprivation and poverty, under which they all live.” The 
article notes that the center “has touched the lives of almost 1,000 people” and quotes 
Oktan saying "we never wanted to do something for them, but only with them” (ibid.). 
For the government, however, it seems these good things are of little interest. No 
politician involved in the renewal project ever mentioned any positive, community-based  
developments in the neighborhood. In the time covered, Sabah ran only a single article 
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 The blog includes a series of photos that offer a third and strongly contrasting view to the two photo series 
I have analyzed in this thesis. They show the neighborhood as vibrant and full of celebrations, and include 
stories of the inhabitants. It can be found here: www.tarlabasiistanbul.com  
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about any kind of positive community development, patronizingly titled “Tarlabaşı’s 
children can touch science” (Altun, 2015); even then, predictably, the article is not about 
positive developments in the neighborhood, but rather about a program that brings a group 
of children from the neighborhood to one of the local universities (Istanbul Technical 
University) every day after school to do experiments, use microscopes, and other science-
related activities. There is no mention of any local efforts to improve the neighborhood, 
nor any mention of positive aspects of the area.  
Instead, the urban renewal project itself is seen as the point of hope for the 
neighborhood. And one of the major hopes it brings is money. The mayor, the 
development company, and Sabah have been bragging for years about the increases in rent 
in the areas being renewed. By 2015 they were claiming that property values in 
Tarlabaşı had increased fiftyfold since the project began (Tarlabaşı 360, Beyoğlu’nda 
fiyatları, 2015). Demircan brags about having added 190 thousand jobs in Beyoğlu since 
he took office, which he gives his urban renewal projects partial credit for (Güngör, 2015). 
In May 2012 parliament passed a bill easing restrictions on foreigners purchasing real 
estate in Turkey (Turkey facilitates real estate, 2012). Sabah predicted that this would 
bring investment that would have otherwise gone to Arab countries that were no longer 
viable because of the effects of the Arab Spring. They note that “according to 
representatives from the real estate sector foreigners are especially gearing towards 
branded projects in centralized locations” where one executive believes “15 to 20% of the 
sales for these projects will be done by foreigners” (ibid). In the article Feyzullah Yetgin, 
the general manager of Çalık Real Estate, notes that “from a location standpoint,” Çalık’s 
projects are “extremely appealing to foreigners.” 
It’s not just money of course. They also try to present the project as a positive thing 
in other respects. For example, in describing the project as a “win-win” strategy, Demircan 
claimed that “the city, the investors, and the property owners will win. And because the 
environment will be beautified, even the public will win” (‘Projede kazan-kazan’, 2010). 
Demircan is fond of declaring that Tarlabaşı Boulevard is going to become the “Champs-
Élysées of Istanbul.”28 And of course, history will win too: 
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 Although, he has also made this same claim about the Okmeydanı urban renewal project (Öztürk, 2016) 
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Frankly, the things that should happen are currently happening in Tarlabaşı. 
Tarlabaşı 360's construction area is in a very special region that has hosted 
different cultures throughout its history and is still carrying the traces of 
those cultures. It is the meeting spot of the ladies and gentlemen of past 
times and the heart of an elite and select life featuring many cultural and 
artistic activities … We are not just building conventional offices and 
residences in Tarlabaşı, we are also trying to bring a nearly extinct history 
back to life and bring back an alive but forgotten treasure in Istanbul in the 
most modern and preserved way possible … The biggest feature of 
Tarlabaşı 360 is the renovation of all the structures by preserving historical 
texture and cultural values. (Turkey's first urban, 2016) 
 
The other two newspapers, however, devote quite a bit of space to denying the 
economic claims made by the project’s supporters. “The 'urban transformation' in 
Istanbul's historical Tarlabaşı neighborhood has started, but inflated property prices do not 
reflect the reality on the ground, according to experts. 'This is an area full of problems. The 
crime rate is extremely high and there is a security problem,' one real estate agent says” 
(Yüzbaşıoğlu, 2010). Architect Cansu Yapıcı, representing İstanbul Culture Variety 
(classic istemezükçü) tries to tear down the municipality’s claims by saying that they are 
trying to turn the city into a sellable commodity, but that “this plan is doomed to backfire 
because by erasing Istanbul’s memory and history, they, on the contrary, are making it less 
of a sellable commodity” (Parlak, 2010). And perhaps most damning are claims that the 
project, which aims to help the neighborhood, may actually make it worse: “As the 
bulldozers move in to one of Istanbul’s most impoverished neighborhoods, the 
municipality is already touting a successful ‘urban transformation’ while critics say the 
project neglects existing cultural heritage and leaves social ills unaddressed.” (Şenerdem, 
2010) 
 
One of the most enthusiastic believers in the hope promised by urban renewal is 
well-known Sabah columnist Hıncal Uluç. In his columns he frequently refers to the other 
transformations in Beyoğlu as miracles (“the Emek cinema miracle”), but in January 2016 
he declared Tarlabaşı to be the most amazing of all. He is worth quoting at length, as the 
story he tells seems to encapsulate the way the government is trying to sell the project (line 
breaks and punctuation are his own): 
 
 49 
You live in a house like a carcass.. 
But a carcass in the literal sense of the word.. Everywhere is filled with 
holes.. 
The storm outside rips through the holes in the worn out walls.. The ceiling 
leaks. 
When you enter the room and turn on the light, enormous sewer rats jump 
out of the holes in the floor and scurry away.. Your street is even 
more vile..  
Forgotten, abandoned, full of holes.. Let alone driving, you can’t even bike 
there.. At night you can’t walk. 
And if you do walk you’re scared.. There are glue sniffers, potheads, 
junkies, drunks. 
Filth.. Darkness.. Danger.. 
Then one day you find a lamp.. 
When you rub it a genie comes out.. “your wish is my command” he says.. 
“This neighborhood.. This house.. One upon a time it was Istanbul’s 
most beautiful, most luxurious, most respected place. Make it like 
that again” you say.. ..and poof!.. 
No, I’m not telling fairy tales, I’m not selling dreams.. 
I went.. I saw.. I walked around.. 
I saw an “Urban Renewal Miracle” in Tarlabaşı.. 
You know those billboards that you see all along that boulevard, the ones 
that say “Tarlabaşı 360..” That’s it.. 
The genie that came out of the lamp, I’ll write it with a capital letter, Genie, 
is Beyoğlu Municipality Mayor Ahmet Misbah Demircan.. 
[…] 
Go inside.. You’ll see a model the size of the room..29 
This is the model of the new Tarlabaşı.. And you won’t believe your eyes.. 
You’ll see with your own eyes what I meant when I said “the genie 
of the lamp..” Tarlabaşı’s appearance from 1870 to 1960 is protected 
and restored. 
History appears, glistening, not a thing has changed.. The miracle is inside.. 
From the outside you see the existing 278, skinny, two-meters wide 
buildings, united on the inside.. 
Get in a helicopter, look, count, there are 278 buildings there.. Go inside.. 
9.. literally nine modern blocks.. 
On the inside they have become 9 buildings, on the outside 278 tiny, useless 
buildings.. 
[…] 
Modern.. Glistening and descend, go out to the street.. 
Beyoğlu!.. 
                                                 
29
 He is referring to the model in the sales office. It is indeed an enormous, impressive, and highly detailed 
model that lights up when you press buttons, shows the acres of parking under the buildings, and is filled 
with people shopping, shopping, and shopping. Every ground floor window seems to have a boutique in it. 
There are also some people relaxing on rooftop terraces. Photography is not allowed. 
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Under the buildings, floors and floors of parking.. So much that there’s 
room for every car.. An indoor pool.. A fitness center and spa.. 
Pilates and Yoga studios.. Even a sauna and a steam room.. Every 
kind of service.. Central heating and air conditioning.. 
Among today’s ruined streets, Paris.. 
On the sidewalks tables.. Boulevard cafes, coffee shops.. And like Paris, art 
galleries behind them.. 
Those who are living in this filth, for whom there seems to be no solution, 
will shortly find themselves living in the world’s most modern 
quality of life, almost like Paris.  
Tell me, if this isn’t a “miracle” what is it? 
Did I exaggerate when I called Ahmet Misbah Demircan “the genie of the 
lamp?” (Uluç, 2016) 
 
He sees no hope in the neighborhood itself – the only way things can improve is 
through an almost literal miracle, an urban savior from outside who appears like a genie. In 
the next chapter we will see what this genie has wrought. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE WEBSITE 
 
 
 
 
The Tarlabaşı 360 marketing team has created three short videos about the project, 
each available in both (and only)
30
 Turkish and English. One of them, called the 
“introduction film” is a short two and a half minute video providing details of the project, 
and emphasizing the perks that the new neighborhood is projected to provide. It consists 
almost entirely of animated renderings of the completed project populated by moving 
white silhouettes of people. The video is accompanied by upbeat accordion music of the 
style one often hears in stereotypical depictions of Paris, likely aiming to draw 
comparisons to the romantic bohemian charm of Montmartre (itself a gentrified 
neighborhood of artisans), and reinforcing Demircan’s vision of Tarlabaşı Boulevard as the 
Champs-Elysées of Istanbul. In lieu of narration short phrases appear at the bottom of the 
screen. These phrases provide descriptions of the project, their tone ranging from strictly 
informative (“63m2 to 630m2 Offices”) to grandiosely vague (“The Project by Which The 
History Revive [sic]”). 
 One series of phrases (it is sometimes unclear whether we are to read subsequent 
phrases as part of the same sentence or as individual labels) promises that the project will 
be a “secure living concept” that will “bring together chic restaurants, cafes, concept 
streets, art galleries, and different cultures.” The video, or the website for that matter, 
doesn’t explain exactly what is meant by “concept streets,” but the phrase appears 
numerous times in the marketing material. In the video it appears over a rendering of a 
                                                 
30
 Interestingly, the website is available in three languages, Turkish, English, and Arabic, but only the 
Turkish and English versions include the “yesterday” and “today” sections – the Arabic-language version 
only gives descriptions of the future properties, and information on how to buy them. Additionally, it only 
has one option for the text in the central black circle, which is the text about promising the future. I’m 
curious if this simply reflects a lack of desire or ability to translate the whole website, or if the designers of 
the website simply felt that Arabic-speaking consumers would not care as much about the historical details. 
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narrow traffic-free (perhaps pedestrian?) lane lined by three- to four-story buildings and 
populated by white silhouette people strolling along or sitting at café tables while their 
silhouette waiters bring them silhouette wine glasses. What exactly is the concept? And 
who exactly are these angelic forms?  
“Concept streets” is the website’s own English translation of the Turkish “konsept 
sokakları,” a phrase which doesn’t seem to have much real meaning in Turkish either.31 An 
alternative and perhaps more appropriate translation would be “themed streets,” but calling 
them “concept streets” has a ring of the theoretical, as if the website is dealing with a sort 
of Platonic ideal of a street which is to be reflected here on earth by the actual completed 
development. In this spirit I examine the images, promotional videos, and other visual 
advertising materials for the project presented on the website to explore what exactly the 
“concept streets” are perceived to look like, what sort of activities take place in them, who 
gets to use them, and what role history has to play.
32
  
My understanding of a “concept street” goes beyond this understanding somewhat, 
as I argue that the developers and the popular discourse have created three different sets of 
concept streets in the same place; a historical set of concept streets, a contemporary set, 
and a projected (and soon to be implemented) future set. Each of these sets of concept 
streets provides space to perform a certain set of values and ideals; each limits the people 
using the streets to a prescribed set of lifestyles, activities, and uses. I argue that some 
features are posited as being appropriate for Tarlabaşı, while other features are not. These 
features are related both to the architecture (the style and scale of buildings, architectural 
details, colors, etc.) and the uses of the streets (modes of consumption, professions, public 
vs. private activities, etc.). Moreover, their appropriateness, or lack thereof, is portrayed as 
timeless, since at one time in the past the streets were correctly inhabited, and at another 
time they were not. Because the streets in question are currently inaccessible due to 
construction, it is clear that none of these concept neighborhoods currently exist in the 
physical world. Moreover, since these three sets of concept streets are effectively 
                                                 
31
 Judging from other sources, it seems that what they mean by a concept street is one in which artists, 
musicians, street performers, and other similar features are sponsored by the state or the developer to 
“enliven” the street.  
32
 After I started working on this chapter the website was completely changed, and the images and videos 
analyzed are no longer available online except through archiving sites like the Internet Archive’s Wayback 
Machine, which unfortunately has not captured the embedded videos. 
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theoretical moments representing specific times (labeled with appropriate vagueness 
“yesterday,” “today,” and “tomorrow” by the website, a practice which I continue here) it 
seems equally clear that none of them ever really existed at all. The only sense in which 
they exist is through a carefully curated set of images that give visual form to prescribed 
ways of living.   
Another reason that I focus on streets is that almost all of the urban renewal 
project’s visual materials focus on the public areas of the neighborhood, including 
restaurants, cafes, and most frequently streets. These street images show the facades of 
buildings, various activities that take place (or are projected to take place) in the street, and 
the people who perform these activities. The street, therefore, seems to form the primary 
way in which the neighborhood is encountered and understood. Since the website is 
essentially a marketing tool oriented towards selling the project, I examine the images and 
graphics as tools that have been purposefully chosen to convey the essence of the project to 
a potential buyer. Because the private spaces within the buildings are usually not shown 
(except in the “tomorrow” section, where they serve to emphasize the exclusivity of the 
interior space), it seems that the role of the public in the streets around the development is 
of primary interest to the developer, and the primary marketing tool to brand the 
development.  
We have seen in chapter 2 that the feelings of reflective nostalgia for the city’s past 
felt by many old Istanbullu residents are a mixture of sadness for those who departed, and 
animosity for the newcomers. While these residents don’t see any possibility of returning 
to the city of the past, their reflective nostalgic sentiment informs the restorative renewal 
projects and gentrification in Istanbul. “French Street” (Fransız Sokağı), for example, a 
completed state-sponsored urban renewal project on a much smaller scale in a nearby 
neighborhood, proclaimed itself to be “reviving” the forgotten (but actually completely 
invented) “French” history of the street. The marketing materials employed the familiar 
narrative of rural migrants destroying the former Europeanness of the neighborhood and 
dragging down its fortunes until, of course, the municipality intervened to return it to its 
“true” form (Mills, 2005; 453). French Street thus, in a way, draws its inspiration from the 
reflective nostalgia of old Istanbul residents while promising to be a restorative project. 
Tarlabaşı 360, I argue, like French Street and the Demirören shopping center, offers an 
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interpretation of the Ottoman past which utilizes that past’s malleability and the dominant 
feelings of nostalgia to create highly profitable spaces of global capitalism.  
 
 
 
4.1 Bringing Yesterday to Tomorrow 
 
 
The first words that appear on a black circle in the center of the screen when you 
access the website for Tarlabaşı 360 are: “In Istanbul, a scene of history comes to life: 
Tarlabaşı Renewal Project” (figure 1). In the background is a rendering of an imagined 
future street scene from the redevelopment project, showing a number of preserved facades 
over a modern café. The historical (or faux-historical) aspects of the architecture, such as 
the protruding bays, 19
th
 century details, and the foreground arching streetlight, are 
emphasized, while the modern changes are shown further back and less prominently. The 
street scene and café, however, are clearly shown to be contemporary, with large red 
umbrellas, men in suits, and neatly potted plants. On the street walking towards us is a very 
modern-looking woman in a professional jacket and a dress that stops at the knee, her 
dyed-blonde hair is uncovered and swings to the side as she walks purposefully down the 
street, briefcase in hand. The umbrellas, people, and ground-level potted plants are shown 
 
Figure 1. Tarlabaşı 360 Website Main Page (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
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in color, while the buildings above are shown in black and white, further emphasizing the 
mix of past and present, and the idea of the past “coming to life.” This image brings into 
sharp focus the concept of street life that the project is aiming to enact, a vision of black-
and-white historic charm as a backdrop for a modern upscale present. Surrounding the 
image are three numbered white circles leading to the three primary divisions of the 
website, labeled: I. Tarlabaşı Yesterday, II. Tarlabaşı Today, and III. Tarlabaşı Tomorrow. 
These white circles are all the same size, providing a sense of equal importance to each of 
them and suggesting that past, present, and future all come together to create the new 
project.  
 
 
I. Tarlabaşı Yesterday 
 
The “Tarlabaşı Yesterday” section (figures 2-5) is a celebration of the late Ottoman 
and early Republican neighborhood. To emphasize the historical nature of this section, the 
old photos of the neighborhood and retro graphics are all in black and white (even those 
background photos that are actually of the neighborhood today have been given a filter to 
make them look like old photographs.) The text in this section provides us with a history of 
the neighborhood that emphasizes the European style of the buildings and the 
cosmopolitan nature of the people. Mention is made of the great fire, the various European 
embassies, Levantine families, and the fact that the cosmopolitan shop owners would 
“leave their houses in Tarlabaşı and walk five minutes to Pera” (note the use of the name 
Pera).  
The retro drawings that accompany these texts (figures 2 and 3) show a number of 
signifiers of the contemporary global nostalgic culture of consumption: an old sewing 
machine, a pocket watch, a gramophone, a well-dressed mustachioed man wielding a 
clunky wooden camera, etc. Alongside these images are the names of craftsmen and 
merchants that correspond to the objects: Paul Giammalva, music studio; Konstantin 
Yoanidis, furniture seller; Gomidas Değirmenciyan, tailor33; Adolf Gelsollen and Jules  
 
                                                 
33
 No mention is made, of course, to any brothel this tailor may have had a hand in managing.    
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Loeffler, architecture and engineering office. None of these names is Turkish, nor even 
Muslim, although this is never explicitly pointed out (compare Boyar and Fleet’s listing of 
non-Muslim businesses in chapter 2). The mix of non-Muslim names of various origin and 
modern/European trades and styles connects the perceived modernity of the neighborhood 
to its perceived cosmopolitanism or multiculturalism. The nostalgia generated for the once-
 
Figure 2. Tarlabaşı Yesterday 1 (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
 
 
Figure 3. Tarlabaşı Yesterday 2 (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
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prosperous, classy, and European-style neighborhood is directly tied to its non-Muslim 
population. 
These nostalgic products and names are given a specifically local context by the 
image they are floating in front of: an aged black and white photo of a local street scene. 
The photograph is not labeled, but judging from the style of the buildings and the 
meandering street it is very likely that it is from Beyoğlu, and could conceivably be from 
Tarlabaşı. These figures, modern (that is: European) for their times by dint of their fashion, 
names, professions, and technologies, are shown in front of buildings that are also 
modern/European for their time. The two seem to fit naturally with each other. Putting 
these names and trades above a background of a historical Beyoğlu street allows viewers of 
the website to imagine the suave mustachioed photographer operating a studio on this 
street, or the German-named architects designing European-style apartment buildings in a 
projecting second-floor bay. Indeed another page of the “Tarlabaşı Yesterday” section 
provides information about the “first apartments” in the area, which are illustrated with a 
sketch of a neo-classical corner façade and a black and white image of İstiklal Avenue. The 
website calls them the “skyscrapers of their time,” emphasizing their modernity.  
Other images from the website reinforce this combination of diversity and 
modernity. One page is titled “Little Pera: Neighborhood of Sincere and Warm Relations” 
and shows photos of smiling, uncovered women. The videos in this section, with names 
like “Tarlabaşı was a Mosaic” and “Tarlabaşı: Little Beyoğlu” (note the shift back to the 
name Beyoğlu) show a barrage of images emphasizing the European/modern nature of the 
neighborhood: cars, billboard advertisements, apartment buildings, and lines of smiling, 
western-attired women (figure 4). The net effect of all these images, particularly in 
combination with the text around them, is to establish a cosmopolitan, European/modern 
identity as the ideal state for the neighborhood’s streets and inhabitants. This plays to the 
nostalgia of those who miss the civility and culture of the departed minorities and lays the 
groundwork for the possibility of a return to this time. It also answers to the first of 
Beauregards’s two criteria for a gentrifiable neighborhood, the “creation of gentrifiable 
housing” (Islam, 2015, p. 124). 
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After the section glorifying Tarlabaşı’s past, however, the tone changes. The textual 
narrative centers on the removal of the non-Muslim groups, and like the Sabah articles 
mentioned in chapter 3 the reasons for their departure are relatively explicit in this telling 
(the website specifically mentions the 6-7 September 1955 events and the Wealth Tax). 
 
Figure 4. Tarlabaşı Yesterday Video Still (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
 
 
Figure 5. Tarlabaşı Changes Hands (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
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This departure of minorities is visually represented by a well-dressed, Western-attired 
woman smiling as she enters a car, perhaps to depart from the neighborhood (figure 5). Her 
clothes and the cars behind her indicate that this photo is from the 1930s or 40s, just before 
the events mentioned in the text took place. She smiles as she enters the car, but with the 
text “Tarlabaşı changes hands” written in a box beside her we understand that she, and the 
elegance and culture she represents, are departing from the neighborhood.  
In the website’s narrative this departure is predictably followed by the influx of 
“the poorest of Anatolia,” who subdivide the apartments and show no appreciation for the 
architecture or history of the neighborhood. The last page in the Tarlabaşı Yesterday 
section is about the opening of Tarlabaşı Boulevard, which the website notes required the 
demolition of 350 “historic” buildings, and which forever cut off the neighborhood from 
the bright lights of Beyoğlu. Tarlabaşı today is a “dark” neighborhood, the “most 
depressed neighborhood in Istanbul.” Most of the population of the blocks to be 
redeveloped, according to the website, “have come from various cities of the Anatolia such 
as Mardin, Siirt, Batman, Erzincan, Diyarbakır, Rize,” and they “mostly perform 
unqualified works with low income such as solid waste collector – street hawker – mussel 
seller.” 
 
 
II. Tarlabaşı Today 
 
The text of the Tarlabaşı Today section describes the state of the neighborhood just 
before the demolitions started, and details the development of the project. The images in 
the background serve to reinforce the sense of the “dark” and “depressed” neighborhood 
(fig. 6-9). Their color palate is subdued, and despite the often-colorful buildings, clothes, 
and details visible in the images, the streets have been given a cool tint so they feel grey, 
dark, and gloomy. The ever-present laundry hanging overhead, the bags of garbage laying 
around, and the emptiness of the street all serve to emphasize the poor condition of the 
neighborhood, and remind us of the popular conception that these people who live here 
now don’t understand how to live in these types of buildings (see chapter 3). Nobody 
smiles, no storefronts or restaurants or other social areas are shown, and no building is 
entered; as usual the neighborhood is seen purely as a series of streetscapes. 
 60 
 
Figure 6 is a heavily symmetrical photo, with buildings rising beyond the top of the 
frame to the left and the right. At the end of the road is the grey façade of an apartment 
building which, though clearly on the other side of a perpendicular street, nevertheless 
functions like a third wall enclosing the scene. On the right side of the frame and 
 
Figure 6. Tarlabaşı Today Streets 1 (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
 
 
Figure 7. Tarlabaşı Today Streets 2 (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
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effectively blocking half of the street stand three or four overflowing bags of garbage, their 
enormous size reinforced by the two figures standing next to them. Those figures, who 
appear to be young men with black hair and dark skin, stand idly on the curb; on close 
inspection they appear to be smiling and chatting to each other, but seen on a small screen 
the details are obscured, and at first glance it seems one of them may in fact be looking at 
the viewer. The scene presents a feeling of claustrophobia and danger – in order to pass to 
the street ahead, one has no choice but to walk very close to the two young men, a risky 
proposition in a dark and otherwise abandoned street. Even though it is a sunny day the 
street is grey, the doorways on either side are dark, and the bay windows that push into the 
frame from the left and right darken the edges of the shot. All of these elements serve to 
reinforce the sense of enclosure, of danger lurking unseen. 
Figure 7 is somewhat better lit, but it still feels dark and foreboding. An old woman 
stands on the right side of the frame wearing a long black coat and a grey scarf. She 
appears to be asleep standing up; her head is resting on her chest and her eyes are closed. 
The fingers of her right hand protrude slightly from the long sleeve of her badly-fitting 
coat. The garbage bag that she stands next to, which again is overflowing, is significantly 
larger than her. Her narcoleptic posture and position facing away from the street and 
towards a bag of garbage give the photo a surreal and dreamy quality. The street is 
potholed, uneven, damp, and dirty. Farther up the hill two men, again in drab colors, walk 
away from the viewer. In the distance is a figure who appears to be holding a large bag and 
picking something up off the street – more garbage collection perhaps. On a balcony to the 
upper right a woman in a pinkish headscarf is standing, perhaps collecting laundry, perhaps 
just looking at the street. Although there are at least six people visible in the photo they are 
all at the margins of the frame or of the street, which itself feels empty and unused. The 
many clothes hanging from the lines strung between buildings obscure the sky. In front of 
the reddish house on the left and the greyish house on the right buckets hang on strings, the 
kind housewives use to raise or lower small objects. Like the woman standing strangely by 
the garbage, the buildings seem to be worn down, asleep on their feet, their beauty hidden 
under a veil of misuse. 
Figures 8 and 9 show three young boys sitting in a doorway. 8 is the version in the 
“gallery” section of the website, while 9 shows how the photo is used in the context of the  
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interactive menu. I’ve included both versions here because they show different amounts of 
the image, showing the way the gallery version was cropped to focus more clearly on the 
children. It is significant that this image forms the background to the “multi-directional 
approach” section of the website, in which the supposed involvement of the community is 
 
Figure 8. Tarlabaşı Today’s Future 1 (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
 
 
Figure 9. Tarlabaşı Today’s Future 2 (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
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discussed. It is also interesting to see that a somewhat retro flower design has been 
superimposed over the walls of the building in figure 9, perhaps referencing the currently 
hip and non-threatening style of street art popular in trendy gentrified neighborhoods 
worldwide. It might also function as a means to hint at future possibilities for this building 
and these boys, who might flower if given the right opportunity (the opportunity implied, 
of course, being wholesale redevelopment and gentrification). 
The building around the three boys shows traces of former beauty obscured by 
neglect: the professionally carved wooden door behind them seems to have been covered 
by haphazard layers of blue and pink paint, while the rounded trim delineating the 
building’s ground floor is chipped and crumbling. From just these small bits one gets the 
sense that the building was once a handsome row house which is no longer being given the 
attention that it deserves, reminding us yet again of the common claim that the people who 
live here now don’t appreciate the building’s form and history. The leftmost third of the 
frame shows a hint of the street, or perhaps an empty lot beside the building, which is dirty 
and uneven, with garbage scattered here and there. Broken chunks of shaped stone lie on 
the ground next to the building’s steps like ancient ruins; their original purpose is unclear 
but they emphasize the destruction of the once more prosperous neighborhood. In the 
background a doorway in a bare concrete wall is bricked in, although the wall ends 
abruptly just next to the doorway. Paint that has been thrown at the grey wall and allowed 
to drip colorfully down adds to the sense of disrespect for the buildings. 
Within this crumbling setting sit the three boys. They have dark complexions, their 
clothes are dirty, and they sit very closely together on the steps of the main entrance. Their 
heads continue the line of trim that extends to the left and the right but is broken by the 
doorway; their bent knees parallel the step they sit on. In this way they fit naturally into the 
physical space and appear to be visually integrated into the architecture. The blues and 
greys of their clothing match the color scheme of the surroundings. The two boys on the 
right are looking above the viewer, perhaps at the photographer or his friend, with 
furrowed brows indicating that they are reacting to something being said. The boy on the 
right grips a silver toy gun in both hands, which he points absent-mindedly just a bit below 
the camera. The fact that they fit so well in the architecture seems to imply an intimate 
connection between the physical space and the poverty and violence of the inhabitants; in 
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front of a run-down building like this, the natural fit is a life of guns and grimy clothes. 
Indeed the boy on the left, whose bright face and pursed lips mark the visual center of the 
image, seems unfazed by all that surrounds him. He gazes impassively at the camera, his 
dark eyes trained directly at the viewer (outside of the historical photos, it is the only 
image on the website that looks back at us). The meaning behind his gaze is unknown; he 
might be posing for the photo, or he might just not care. In the context of the other images 
on the website and the text surrounding him, however, it seems we are to read him as we 
read the buildings: as objects/lives that risk squandering their potential, and that are 
pleading for help that can only come from outside the neighborhood, from outside these 
streets. 
The fact that this boy is the only image on the website that seems to challenge the 
documentary focus of the images is important. As European Orientalism claimed for itself 
the power to represent the Orient as a place frozen in the past and impenetrable (Said, 
1978), and positioned itself as best able to save these areas from themselves, so the website 
gives the municipality and developer the ability to represent the neighborhood as they see 
fit, and ascribe to themselves the power to save it from its current inhabitants. The people 
in the images have no power to show their own lives or their own thoughts; in neither the 
photos nor the accompanying text is space provided for the current inhabitants of Tarlabaşı 
to speak for themselves. Like many other understandings of the neighborhood we have 
seen, the website looks at the ruins of the Ottoman neighborhood and sees a disconnect 
between the past glory and the present inhabitants. 
 
 
III. Tarlabaşı Tomorrow 
 
In all of the renderings in the “Tarlabaşı Tomorrow” section, the formerly multi-
colored houses have been refaced in subdued browns and whites more suitable to the 
refined taste of the new inhabitants (fig. 10-19). Despite this, the renderings are 
considerably brighter and more cheerfully colored than the photographs of Tarlabaşı today. 
The sun seems perpetually aligned at just the right angle to illuminate the street (and even, 
amazingly, the underside of the projecting bays), flowers and plants decorate every 
balcony and doorway, and the stone walls of the “restored” facades glow warmly. Nobody  
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sits in doorways or stands idly on street corners. Everybody is either walking purposefully 
along, or engaged in leisure consumption with their friends. In contrast to the “today” 
photos’ lack of social spaces, the new Tarlabaşı positively overflows with cafes and 
restaurants with names like “Cafe de Sentrope” (Saint-Tropez) and “Coffee 386”. 
Figure 10 shows a renovated residential street and the people who will presumably 
inhabit it. A woman with uncovered light brown hair and wearing a sleeveless shirt holds 
 
Figure 10. Tarlabaşı Tomorrow Residential Street (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
 
 
Figure 11. Tarlabaşı Tomorrow Concept Street (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
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her blonde laughing baby in her arms. A young girl walking on the street behind them can 
be plausibly connected to them, through hair color and the direction of movement. 
Assuming that she belongs to the sleeveless mother, there are no unattended children and 
no signs of toy guns. On the right, a man and a woman dressed in business clothes and 
holding briefcases are leaving their house; through the closing door we can see a large 
artwork hanging on the wall. On the far left two women are walking, one of them holding a 
shopping bag. Off to work and back from the mall – these are some of the pastimes of the 
new residents of the neighborhood. 
In figure 11 a man walks down the steps of his building to the right chatting on his 
phone, while to the left a woman searches in her bag, perhaps to begin her own phone call. 
A café takes up much of the street, essentially privatizing it and limiting the uses of what 
used to be public space. Sitting at one of the tables of the café are two attractive young 
businesspeople, a man and a woman, who ignore each other to look down at their 
smartphones. They appear to be black or mixed-race; perhaps they are checking in with 
their office back in London or New York. Or maybe they have just taken selfies in their 
“authentic” Istanbul backstreet brunch spot, and they have to post them on facebook before 
their friends in America wake up. Next to them a woman finds herself essentially eating 
alone as her friend casually ignores her to play with her tablet. Instead of playing with 
plastic guns and collecting garbage, the people in the future Tarlabaşı will be playing with 
iPhones and collecting information. Instead of communicating with the street through 
baskets lowered on strings, they are communicating wirelessly with people who may be 
worlds away. In fact, despite being a fairly densely populated image, nobody in this image 
appears to be communicating or in any way interacting with anyone around them.  
Figure 12 shows a view of an office block, the same one we saw in figure one. The 
evenly paved sidewalk (or perhaps a pedestrianized street, echoing Demircan’s claim about 
Taksim belonging to pedestrians) is bustling with people, their overwhelmingly blonde 
hair luminous in the warm, late afternoon sunlight, which inexplicably illuminates them 
from multiple directions (compare the illumination of the three right-most figures to that of 
the two men exiting the office building). Although this is an office block, only one man 
seems dressed for the office; everyone else is strolling along, sometimes holding hands 
with their lovers. Light brown and artificial blonde are the dominant hair colors, and  
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contemporary Western clothing trends are well represented. No women wear veils. Just as 
the late-Ottoman neighborhood represented an adoption of European forms of sociality, 
this image and the others in the “Tarlabaşı tomorrow” section show a deluge of Western 
consumption, work, and leisure lifestyles. This rendering could even be read to imply an 
allowance for “non-traditional” family structures that are now becoming more publically 
visible in the West – is that a lesbian couple pushing their son down the street in his 
stroller?
34
  
But what is absent from this picture? Potential lesbian family aside, there is no 
diversity in these renderings. Even though the marketing materials make a point of 
describing the development as a multicultural environment, where are those multiple 
cultures? It’s very possible that some of those pictured are European (a Turkish friend of 
mine, upon seeing the renderings, exclaimed “ah, there will be Swedish people living 
there!”), but the people shown are a far cry from those pictured in the section on Tarlabaşı 
today. Indeed, the only non-white people in any of the “tomorrow” renderings are the two 
                                                 
34
 Judging by the state discourse on homosexuality it seems unlikely that this state-affiliated project would be 
openly promoting “alternative” family structures here; still, the possibility is there to read this grouping of 
people that way, and it’s not inconceivable that someone in the design team made it purposefully ambiguous. 
 
Figure 12. Tarlabaşı Tomorrow’s Alternative Families? (Source: 
www.tarlabasi360.com) 
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light-skinned black people in figure 11. It’s possible that these people are stock images 
aimed at an American or European audience – in America these people would fulfill the 
diversity quota. But in the context of Turkey these people read as Western, particularly 
since they are some of the best-dressed people shown in any of the renderings, as opposed 
to the African migrants who live in the neighborhood before the transformation. 
Completely absent from all renderings are the dark-complexioned people who make up the 
majority of the population of the “today” photographs. The mussel-seller from Mardin 
does not appear in any of the images.  
 
 
 
4.2 Remembering/Imagining Cosmopolitanism 
 
 
In much the same way that Turkish nationalism saw the foreigners and non-
Muslims of Pera as a kind of colonial class, gentrification today is often described by 
analogy to colonialism. The people moving in often live lives that are segregated from the 
surrounding city, and may indeed have closer ties to people living in gentrified 
neighborhoods around the world than to people in the city around them (Atkinson and 
Bridge, 2005, p. 9). Despite the emphasis in the advertising materials on the centrality of 
the neighborhood within the city, the images presented on the website (such as the 
wirelessly connected restaurant customers in figure 11, the metal detectors in the video, 
and the social areas for “your exclusive use,”) all point to this as a neighborhood detached 
from the city around it. Since in developing nations gentrification often takes place 
alongside market reforms, increased market permeability, and internal migration, the 
people who move into these neighborhoods are many times even “western ex-patriots 
employed by transnational corporations to open up the markets of the newly emerging 
economies” (ibid, p. 3). We know from the developer’s claims that they intend for the 
neighborhood to be an “international” one; the people that my Turkish friend read as 
Swedish and the Western-looking black people in figure 11 work to advertise this 
intention, as does the fact that the website exists in nearly identical English and Turkish 
versions.  
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In the absence of any human local diversity, the video’s claim to a “multicultural 
atmosphere” (figure 13) is supported solely by the memory of previous diversity; that is, 
by the preserved facades of the buildings themselves. Wendy Shaw, in her work on 
Sydney’s gentrifying neighborhoods, discusses this phenomenon, which she refers to as 
façadism: “In this façadism compromise (between retaining a whole ‘heritage’ building 
and complete replacement), which seems to indicate that a little bit of heritage is better 
than none at all, it is the purpose of the factory, its business such as ‘The Printery’ and 
‘The Piano Factory’, that is celebrated” (Shaw, 2005, p. 66). When it comes to working-
class housing, however, retaining “authentic” interiors is not as important as keeping the 
street-wall of the building, and the value of the interior becomes not what was originally 
built, but what it can become. Figure 14 shows the interior of a block, illustrating the 
complete lack of historical references in the non-public areas of the project. In Tarlabaşı, 
then, the aesthetic choice to preserve merely the facades of buildings foregrounds the 
former purpose of the neighborhood - in the sense of recreating the type of socio-cultural 
and economic environment that these buildings are imagined to have first played host to.  
 
Figure 13. Tarlabaşı Tomorrow Video: Multicultural Facades (Source: 
www.tarlabasi360.com) 
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That is, they are to function in the future as they are remembered to have done in the past: 
as a part of the global economy, allowing locals to participate in global lifestyles and 
global consumption patterns. Since the original inhabitants of the neighborhood are seen to 
have been interested in participating in their contemporary “global” (that is, European)  
trends, the development seeks to return once again to this condition. The migrants, 
immigrants, and social outcasts who call the neighborhood home “today” are seen as 
historically inaccurate for the neighborhood.  
 
Figure 14. Example of the Interior of a Tomorrow Block (Source: 
www.beyoglubuyukdonusum.com) Note that the windows on the right are the interior-
facing side of a historical façade. 
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Part of the concept of these streets appears to be their neighborhood scale. We’ve 
seen how the “yesterday” section of the website mentions the multi-story buildings that 
developed along Tarlabaşı Boulevard, but on the side streets the buildings are shown to be 
of a smaller scale. In the renderings for the “tomorrow” section, the modern upper stories 
of the buildings are consistently cropped out of the images, giving the impression of a  
 
fairly low-rise neighborhood of three or four stories, similar to that which exists now. In 
reality the modern additions to the historical facades, while far short of fifteen stories, will 
stretch two or three stories above higher than the buildings in the neighborhood today.  
None of the renderings on the website or anywhere else I’ve been able to find show 
the interiors of the blocks, except for some technical PDFs available to download from the 
municipality’s urban renewal website (see figure 15). These documents show that the 
reimagined residential blocks consist of a circle of street-abutting buildings surrounding a 
hollow open-air center featuring trees, grass, and, of course, cafes. In contrast to the street-
facing outer edges of the blocks there are no historical details here. Instead the donut-hole 
parks are surrounded by modern, glassy, high-walled facades. The heavily advertised 
 
Figure 15. Plan of a Future Residential Block Showing Interior Open Space (Source: 
www.beyoglubuyukdonusum.com) 
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historical “preservation,” the very thing that allows the developers to lay claim to a legacy 
of diversity and history, is revealed to be nothing but a wall separating the nostalgic 
 
Figure 16. Tomorrow’s Metal Detectors (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
 
 
Figure 17. Tomorrow’s Exclusivity (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
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“public” spaces of the development from the isolated and international interior of clean 
lines and placeless luxury.  
The border between this external historical place and the interior modernity is 
clearly marked in renderings for the new project. In the video, the image behind a text 
describing the amount of office space available shows the entrance to an office block, with 
two large metal detectors featured prominently in the foreground (figure 16). Metal 
detectors are not uncommon in centrally located office buildings in Istanbul, but their 
presence here also emphasizes the buildings’ isolation from the neighborhood around 
them, and suggests that the people who will be working inside these buildings need to be 
protected. The apartment buildings are often accessed via the interior courtyard, which 
itself may have only one street entrance, rather than directly from the street as they are 
today. This follows a general trend towards gated communities in Istanbul (Bartu Candan 
and Kolluoğlu, 2008) and highlights the insular and private nature of the planned 
apartments. In another shot (figure 17), the contemporary balconies of the top-floor 
modern additions features the text “social areas for your exclusive use” and shows 
silhouettes standing around. Non-consumption, or idleness, “today” an activity of the 
street, will “tomorrow” be safely ensconced in an exclusive and private interior world. The 
street will be a space for leisure consumption, as we’ve seen, and, in contrast to the 
narcolepsy and idleness seen in the “today” section, the text of the video promises an 
“active lifestyle” for the residents of “tomorrow.” Private things like laundry, ubiquitous in 
the “today” photos, will likely be relegated to the interior too.  
Shaw notes that in Sydney modifications and renovations of the historical houses 
are widely considered “anti-heritage,” meaning that migrants are “blamed” for defacing 
“authentic” heritage, and they associate migrants with ‘tasteless’ renovation. During 
renovations “the layer of history added by these migrants is therefore unwanted, and 
usually removed” (Shaw, 2005, p. 65). The overwhelming beigeness of the buildings, 
bringing to mind the monochrome of Paris given a warmer Mediterranean tint, is a strong 
contrast to the multicolored neighborhood of today, where buildings are painted in vibrant 
reds, blues, greens, and yellows, or covered in multi-colored tiles. While certainly in line 
with contemporary upscale fashions, the lack of polychromality may also reference the 
lack of façade colors in old photographs (due, perhaps, to their being black and white). If  
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the historical neighborhood is understood (accurately or not) to have been monochrome, 
then the multicolored façades of today can be seen as part of the undesirable ahistorical 
modifications imposed by the migrant workers. By removing these modifications (the new 
facades are designed “in accordance with their original”) we can see the importance placed 
on the historical value of the buildings rather than their age value (figure 18). 
 
Figure 18. Future Respect for the Original Style (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
 
 
Figure 19. Future Revival (Source: www.tarlabasi360.com) 
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In fact, in the renderings every single physical trace of the changes wrought by the 
second half of the 20
th
 century have been removed – it is as if we have skipped over the 
period of migrants completely, without the neighborhood changing at all in between. We 
are reminded of Hıncal Uluş’s claim, while looking at the model, that “Tarlabaşı’s 
appearance from 1870 to 1960 is protected and restored. History appears, glistening, not a 
thing has changed” (Uluş, 2016) All of the facades that don’t have the desired Belle 
Époque style have been replaced with elaborate, postmodern, sometimes vaguely 
historicist infill. The project wants to create an architectural future in which the preceding 
half-century is erased from the face of the city (figure 19) 
But for now, when we still remember what the neighborhood looks like today, it is 
necessary to emphasize the negative aspects of the first transition. The website does stress 
the actions taken that caused the rupture – not terribly strongly or in great detail, but still it 
admits to some of them, filling in to a small extent the separation between yesterday and 
today. The act of admitting a wrong by the state, however, serves here to obscure the 
upcoming separation between today and tomorrow – the people who exist “today” have 
simply vanished “tomorrow.” 
 
  
 76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
The presumed success of the Tarlabaşı 360 is already inspiring other gentrification 
projects around the city. Demircan says the project is going to be “like a hole in a sock,” 
that is, once it starts it will just keep growing and growing. He claims that people come up 
to him on the street and ask him to renew their neighborhoods too (Taş, 2012). Coming up 
next in Beyoğlu are the Piyalepaşa urban renewal project (current status: “high earthquake 
risk and poor quality social life”), and of course the transformation of the hard-to-tame 
Okmeydanı neighborhood (another contender for Istanbul’s future “Champs-Élysées” 
which today is most often associated with “terrorists”). And it might not just be Istanbul – 
in the same article he claims that people come from Arab countries and are so impressed 
by the transformations taking place in Istanbul that they want to repeat it in their country. 
The state is treating Tarlabaşı as a model, as a test case for other, similar projects that 
could be implemented around the country. It would be interesting to examine some of 
these projects, and the way their rhetoric and justifications compare to that of Tarlabaşı 
(the recently-initiated rebuilding of Diyarbakır comes to mind).  
Parts of the development are starting to take physical shape behind the scaffolding, 
and in its present, under-construction shape the project’s claims and contradictions are 
clearly displayed (figures 20-23). Figure 20 shows the advertisements on Tarlabaşı 
Boulevard, which include imitation projecting bays, to give a nostalgic physical form to 
even the scaffolding for the restoration project. The project as preservation is emphasized 
by the fact that some of the few facades preserved in place at the site are clearly visible 
from the boulevard (figure 21). At the same time, a sign that includes a photo of Erdoğan 
and Demircan holding an award proclaims that “the new Tarlabaşı is the future,” which at  
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the moment has a clearly modern under-construction building behind it (figure 22). That 
building’s advertisement (figure 23), featuring a sketch of the building so rough and 
without detail that the age or youth of the building is impossible to determine (although the  
 
 
Figure 20. Advertising Signs at the Construction Site (Source: author’s photograph) 
 
 
Figure 21. Preserved Facades at the Construction Site (Source: author’s photograph) 
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Figure 22. New Buildings and Advertising at the Construction Site 1 (Source: author’s 
photograph) 
 
 
Figure 23. New Buildings and Advertising at the Construction Site 2 (Source: author’s 
photograph) 
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actual building taking shape behind it makes its modernity abundantly clear); the sign says 
“a modern future in the footsteps of the past.”  
How this new version of Tarlabaşı will be accepted and used remains to be seen. 
Perhaps people will reject the historicism as artificial. Maybe it will even be seen as a 
failure. One of my students, who lives in a gated community on the Asian side, told me 
that, while the grounds inside the compound’s walls are very nice, she doesn’t like where 
she lives because there are so many poor people surrounding the development. It’s hard to 
say if wealthy people will really be happy to live and work in a neighborhood that, despite 
the renewal project, is nevertheless strongly associated with danger. 
While many historians argue that Pera in the late Ottoman period had 
characteristics that resembled a colonial situation, they all argue that it was ultimately a 
mixed urban space where foreigners, Ottoman Muslims, and Ottoman non-Muslims of 
different socioeconomic levels shared the same streets and neighborhoods. The name of 
the project implies that the neighborhood will have come “360” degrees, and thus returned 
to its historical condition, and its possible that they may be more right than they know. 
While the state envisions both the past and the future of the neighborhood as a wealthy, 
Western, and secure place, it’s possible that what will come into being will be more mixed, 
at least in its officially public streets. 
While the concept streets of yesterday and today can be contrasted to the “actual” 
streets that existed there, those of tomorrow as yet exist only through architectural 
renderings. It would therefore be interesting, once the project is complete, to do an 
interview-based research about how people react to the buildings. It will also be interesting 
to see who actually uses the new spaces, and how. Yesterday and today we can see that 
local forces subverted the use of the neighborhood that is being presented by the state, and 
there’s no reason to think that “tomorrow” will be any different. The new buildings will 
likely someday develop uses that are far from what they are today anticipated to be. 
Açıkgöz (2014) notes that in the early republican period, the state engaged in two 
forms of appropriation of monuments. First, by changing the function of the monument, 
for example, turning Topkapı Palace into a museum “less than five months after the 
declaration of the republic… was a bold symbolic act seeking to relegate the recently 
demised Ottoman Empire into a distant past, and terminate its contemporary political 
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relevance.” Secondly, by the “discursive appropriation of historical patrimony,” meaning 
that monuments were collapsed into expressions of Turkish genius, rather than Ottoman or 
Seljuk, fitting them into the concept of the nation-state (p. 170). The current Tarlabaşı 
project, however, seems to be doing exactly the opposite on both points. First, by 
“reverting” the neighborhood to the imagined late-Ottoman lifestyle of global trends and 
cosmopolitanism, it seeks to forge a greater proximity to the Ottoman past, which the 
republican period had attempted to make distant. It also attempts to distance itself from the 
republican period, by specifically pointing to things that removed the non-Muslims from 
the city. Second, they are attempting to put into monumentalized form a broadening of the 
meaning of the Ottoman Empire from its preferred republican understanding, that is as a 
Turkish empire, to a multicultural melting pot.   
At the same time I have argued that, in contrast to republican planning which 
declared itself to undertake “creative destruction,” the Tarlabaşı project is less honest about 
its underlying motives. The project presents itself as respecting the past (and in fact, some 
people speak so enthusiastically about this that it’s likely they actually believe that these 
projects are preservation), but in fact it is just as destructive as modernist planning. If one 
looks at satellite images of the neighborhood now nothing is left – even the streets have 
been erased. Walking through the neighborhood today one can find almost no trace of the 
historical urban fabric. Even though they actively employ the language of respecting the 
past, the actual construction shows incredibly little actual preservation.  
The mayor’s conception of what a municipality should do is rooted in the Kemalist 
state-dominated idea of public space. Ozil claims that in the Ottoman 6
th
 district the 
municipality followed the people; she argues that the boundaries of the district were drawn 
based on a specific urban pattern that already existed there, and that it was chosen as the 
experimental urban planning site because of its already existing urban milieu. But even 
then, what was meant by experimental urban planning site (as Çelik describes) was not an 
effort to control the forces that were already there, but rather to better cater to them. There 
was no attempt at demographic engineering of the sort we see in Beyoğlu today. At the 
same time there are similarities: in the late Ottoman period the transformations were for 
foreigners, who had different standards for urban amenities. We have seen how this too 
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continued through the republican period and remains an important force facing 
development projects today (so much so that foreigners ask about it before investing).  
In fact, another way of understanding the project might be as a bid to emphasize the 
Europeanness of Istanbul. This was suggested in the constant comparisons to Paris, which 
is after all the “capital of modernity” (Harvey, 2003). I noted earlier some of the 
conceptions of what it means to be European – to have Jews, a church and a city hall, 
modernity. The new Tarlabaşı will include a number of signifiers of European modernity, 
including sidewalk cafes, big shopping boulevards, small pedestrianized streets, historical 
architecture, multiculturalism, and respect for history.  
Ozil (2015) notes that “the modern Istanbul that came into being in the nineteenth 
century was mostly the work of local Greek and Armenian architects,” a fact which she 
asserts is “hardly known by current inhabitants of Istanbul using [these] buildings” (p. 
145). It seems, however, that even if they aren’t aware of the ethnicity of the architects, 
they are still aware of the buildings as signifiers of a vanished cosmopolitanism that 
certainly included non-Muslims.  
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